#Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement by Drumbl, Michelle Lyon
[301] 
Articles 
MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL* 
#Audited: Social Media and Tax 
Enforcement 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 302 
I. Tensions Arising from the Collision of Automation,
Convenience, Privacy, and Expectations .............................. 307 
A. Is Our Collective Notion of Privacy Slowly Changing?
Examples Outside the Realm of Tax Administration .... 308 
1. Government Agency Use of Social Media Mining
and Big Data ............................................................. 309 
2. Private Actor Use of Social Media Mining and
Big Data ................................................................... 318 
B. What Is a Taxpayer’s Right to Privacy? ........................ 320 
1. IRS Use of Data Analytics—Past and Future .......... 323 
2. Disproportionate Enforcement on Lower-Income
Taxpayers, and Implications for Taxpayer Privacy . 326
3. Differing Policy Implications for the IRS
Examination and Collection Functions .................... 328 
* Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law and Tax Clinic Director,
Washington and Lee University School of Law. I wish to extend special thanks to the 
participants of the 2019 National Tax Association Annual Conference on Taxation, 
including Leandra Lederman, Emily Satterthwaite, Dave Williams, and Ted Afield, and to 
Steven Dean, Heather Field, Adam Thimmesch, Miranda Fleisher, Susan Morse, Jordan 
Barry, Shu-Yi Oei, Ben Leff, Emily Cauble, Brian Galle, and Darien Shanske for their 
comments. Thank you also to Franklin Runge, Mark Drumbl, Jeff Lyon, Leanne Scott, and 
Margaret Hu for early stage inspiration and brainstorming. I am incredibly grateful to Seth 
Kuntz, Angela Cannon, and Hunter Rush for their stellar research assistance, and to the 
Frances Lewis Law Center at the Washington and Lee University School of Law for support 
of the project. 
302 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 301 
4. Differing Policy Implications for Civil Tax
Enforcement and Criminal Tax Enforcement .......... 332 
II. Punishing the Unsophisticated: Pondering Braggadocio,
Whistleblowers, and the Quest to Close the Tax Gap ........... 333 
A. The Temptation to Disregard Individual Privacy
Concerns ........................................................................ 334 
B. Whistleblowers: Should the IRS Encourage Social
Media Snitching, and Under What Circumstances? ...... 340 
C. Proposals for Setting IRS Policies on Social Media
Mining: Balancing Modern Enforcement Techniques
with a Taxpayer Right to Privacy .................................. 343 
1. The IRS Should Clarify Its Understanding of the
Taxpayer “Right to Privacy” .................................... 343 
2. Increase Transparency of Audit Techniques ............ 344 
3. Limit Social Media Investigations to Manual
Searches Rather than Automated, and Define
Limits in the Internal Revenue Manual .................... 344 
4. If Automated Social Media Mining Is Used,
Implement Use of Pre-Examination Soft Letters to
Nudge Taxpayers Detected by the Algorithm .......... 347 
5. Sharply Define the Social Media Mining Criteria,
Using It to Target Only the Most Egregious
Noncompliance ........................................................ 348 
6. Use Social Media Mining Only at Taxpayer’s
Request, as a Method of Dispute Resolution ........... 350 
III. Broader Implications for Representing Low-Income
Taxpayers in the #TMI Era ................................................... 351 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 357 
INTRODUCTION 
ith budget constraints and a mission that has been expanded by 
Congress over time, it is not surprising that the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) is looking for new tools to maximize its enforcement 
efficiency. Ever-advancing technology provides new opportunities for 
the IRS, and in turn, new privacy concerns for taxpayers. 
In December 2018, the IRS made headlines when it issued a request 
for information (RFI) seeking social media research tools available in 
W 
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the marketplace.1 In its RFI, the IRS referenced the limits on its own 
employees’ abilities to engage in social media research,2 and it stated 
its hope to engage a vendor-supplied tool that would allow the agency 
to access publicly available social media to “expedite IRS case 
resolution for existing compliance cases, providing a more efficient 
way of identifying resources and assisting with the collection of known 
tax deficiencies, leading to increased collection of revenue involving 
unfiled tax returns and other tax liabilities.”3 The RFI noted that the 
agency “respects taxpayer rights” and stated that “such a tool would 
not be used to search the internet or social media sites for purposes of 
identifying or initiating new tax audits” but rather to “assist with 
previously identified tax compliance cases.”4  
The RFI also mentions a potential benefit to taxpayers, which is that 
the IRS believes a social media mining tool could aid in the resolution 
of tax-related identity theft.5 The RFI does not elaborate further on this 
potential use, though it is worth imagining how the IRS might use 
social media constructively rather than for enforcement.6 The RFI 
concludes by noting that the IRS intends to “be mindful that frequently 
information posted on social media and the internet may be wrong or 
misleading.”7 
The RFI does not explicitly define the term “social media” or list 
examples of the sites the IRS is interested in reviewing. Presumably the 
term would encompass websites in which users create profiles and may 
interact with one another, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
LinkedIn.8 Demographic studies reveal that a majority of American 
1 Jared Gilmour, The IRS Wants Help Scouring Social Media for Clues on Tax Cheats, 
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 28, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation 
-world/national/article223681430.html.
2 The RFI cites to IRM 11.3.21.8.1(4) as prohibiting IRS employees from logging into
social media sites to carry out compliance-related work and states that “the IRS currently
has no formal tool to access [] public information [used by taxpayers to advertise, promote,
and sell products and services], compile social media feeds, or search multiple social media
sites.” DEP’T OF TREASURY, IRS, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, SOLICITATION NO.





6 See discussion infra Section II.C.6. 
7 IRS RFI, supra note 2; see also infra Section II.A (discussing the seeming contradiction 
between the IRS’s goals of efficiency and the extra cost and work that would be required 
for a human being to sort through misleading claims). 
8 See Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RSCH.  
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/03/01/social-media-use 
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adults use Facebook and YouTube on their computer or cellphone.9 
Younger adults (age 18–24) use a wider variety of sites and do so more 
frequently.10 A 2012 study showed that younger adults are more likely 
to use social media than older adults, and urban dwellers are 
significantly more likely to use social media than those who live in 
rural areas; however, the study did not reveal a statistically significant 
disparity in overall social media site use across different household 
income levels.11 Interestingly, even those who abstain from social 
media may not be as hidden from sight as they think. Researchers report 
that individuals with no social media accounts themselves are likely 
drawn into this public sphere, with algorithms able to draw predictive 
and reasonably accurate12 findings about an individual based upon 
postings by those of the individual’s friends, family, and acquaintances 
who do have a social media presence.13 
The thought of IRS employees searching through individual 
taxpayers’ social media sites presents concerns on multiple fronts: 
What policies or limits might the agency adopt? Might the IRS later 
expand the program beyond the stated intention to use such practices 
only in existing compliance cases? This Article begins by considering 
the potential implications to taxpayer privacy rights of such an 
initiative, and questions whether it may conflict with the statutory 
notion of a taxpayer’s right to privacy.14 Speaking for myself, I bristle 
-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/L432-JGTW]. Smith and Anderson also define social media as
including YouTube, Snapchat, Pinterest, and WhatsApp. Id.
9 Id. (noting that 68% of American adults are Facebook users, with 74% of Facebook 
users accessing it on a daily basis, and that a majority of American adults in all demographic 
groups, other than individuals 65 and older, currently use Facebook). 
10 Id. 
11 Maeve Duggan & Joanna Brenner, The Demographics of Social Media Users — 2012, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. 3 (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/02/14/the 
-demographics-of-social-media-users-2012/ [https://perma.cc/U8AX-8NXN].
12 Jessica Baron, Think Your Data Is Private Because You’re Not on Social Media?
Think Again, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessicabaron
/2019/01/23/think-your-data-is-private-because-youre-not-on-social-media-think-again
/#7ab38b814a16 [https://perma.cc/HL8C-2BQW] (“The original user’s Tweets allowed
them to predict future tweets with an accuracy rate of roughly 64% and the user’s contacts
gave them enough data to predict behavior with an accuracy rate of 61%.”).
13 Id. Baron’s article describes the work of James P. Bagrow et al., Information Flow
Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 122, 122 (2019)
(“As few as 8–9 of an individual’s contacts are sufficient to obtain predictability comparable
to that of the individual alone.”).
14 Concerns about taxpayer privacy are certainly not new. Tax scholars such as Michael
Hatfield have written multiple thoughtful pieces addressing privacy in taxation, including
the scope of the IRS’s power to collect personal information. See Michael Hatfield, Privacy
in Taxation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (2017) (“[A]mong government agencies, the
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at the idea of the IRS staking out an ever-more invasive footprint into 
the private life of any individual taxpayer. Regardless of one’s views 
on taxpayer privacy, this Article makes a deeper inquiry: it asks not 
whether the IRS has the right to access and use this information for 
examination and collections purposes but whether, as a matter of social 
policy, it is appropriate and desirable for the IRS to trawl for such 
information, and to do so in a civil context as opposed to in a criminal 
case.  
Beyond questions of privacy, a broader concern is the potential for 
social media mining to create disproportionate harms for low-income 
taxpayers. As this Article will describe, low-income taxpayers are 
already subject to disproportionate rates of tax enforcement relative to 
most other income bands. Moreover, this economically vulnerable 
population is also subject to intrusive and judgmental monitoring in 
other contexts.15 On balance, it strikes me that to use social media 
mining as a tax enforcement tool is to simply add a layer of further 
indignity onto a population that is already subject to increased digital 
surveillance by virtue of lacking income or wealth. 
Thus, the primary focus of this Article is to question whether, in light 
of the IRS’s need to make the most of diminished resources,16 it is 
equitable to further automate its examination and collections tactics in 
a way that punishes unsophisticated behavior. In particular, this Article 
articulates a concern that the use of social media mining may pose a 
greater harm to low-income taxpayers relative to other types of 
taxpayers, in part because it is easier for the IRS to direct automated 
resources at the types of issues involved in examining those returns.17 
Many low-income families rely on the tax filing system to claim critical 
social welfare benefits such as the earned income tax credit and child 
IRS has the broadest legal authority to collect information that minimizes privacy . . . .”). 
Likewise, Kimberly Houser and Debra Sanders have raised concerns about how the IRS is 
already using social media to collect taxpayer information, asserting that the IRS is engaging 
in social media data mining in ways that breach taxpayer privacy. Kimberly A. Houser & 
Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of 
Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 817 (2017). 
15 See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
16 See, e.g., IRS Oversight: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th 
Cong. 86 (2019) (testimony of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration) [hereinafter George testimony]; Robert A. Weinberger, Budget Blues for 
Tax Administration, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 13, 2020) (showing in a chart how IRS 
appropriations fell by 21% from 2010 to 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox 
/budget-blues-tax-administration [https://perma.cc/G6ML-U2UY]. 
17 See infra Section I.B.2. 
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tax credit. Congress has chosen this system to reward and incentivize 
work and to help lift working families from poverty.18 In many cases, 
the working families eligible for these benefits have a zero-tax liability 
because they earn less than the standard deduction. While taxpayers 
with annual income below the standard deduction are generally not 
required to file an income tax return, they must file a return to claim 
these valuable refundable credits. Concerns about how enforcement 
techniques involving social media mining may disproportionately 
impact low-income taxpayers are especially relevant in light of data 
from recent years showing that the IRS audits the poor at a similar rate 
to the highest-earning taxpayers19 and in light of the IRS defending that 
practice as justified given its available resources.20 
To clarify, this Article does not condone tax noncompliance, and 
as a tax attorney, I would never advise my clients that “a little cheating 
is OK.” While taxpayer privacy and the possibility of disparate 
treatment of taxpayers are the main concerns of this Article, my 
thoughts are tempered with realism and cost-benefit considerations. 
Just as the police tolerate a little bit of speeding (e.g., ignoring those 
who drive seventy-four miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone, 
but pursuing those who drive eighty-five miles per hour), it does not 
seem practical or cost efficient to pursue every perceived case of tax 
18 See, e.g., MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL, TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR: A 
CALL FOR REFORM (2019) (detailing the history of the earned income tax credit and child 
tax credit and exploring the reasons why Congress has chosen the IRS to administer these 
social benefits).  
19 Paul Kiel, It’s Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About the Same 
Rate as the Top 1%, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.propublica.org 
/article/irs-now-audits-poor-americans-at-about-the-same-rate-as-the-top-1-percent [https: 
//perma.cc/CAK2-SE25]. 
20 William Hoffman, IRS Exams Focus on EITC Claims, Not Poor, Inspector General 
Says, TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today 
-federal/tax-system-administration/irs-exams-focus-eitc-claims-not-poor-inspector-general
-says/2019/09/27/29zm4 [https://perma.cc/G4RK-P9WE]. Subcommittee Chair Mike
Quigley asked, “So if you have fewer resources, it makes sense to audit poor people more?”
In response, Treasury Inspector General J. Russell George replied, “It’s somewhat more
complicated than that” and explained that audit work on EITC claimants is easier than on
high-income taxpayers, “especially with the work of junior IRS employees. . . . The more
sophisticated the income tax, the more involved it is, the longer it takes. It really boils down
to how [the IRS] allocates their resources.” Id. (alteration in original). Hoffman reports that
when asked about possible racism or bias in IRS examination policies, George replied,
“None of our work has shown any evidence that bias is occurring in terms of those with
money versus those with less money . . . [b]ut there is no question that more low-income
people are being examined than upper-income people.” Id.; see also George testimony,
supra note 16, at 86 (“As a percentage of overall enforcement revenue collected, the amount
attributable to automated [functions are] increasing . . . [while o]ther types of enforcement
actions . . . are decreasing.”).
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noncompliance. For example, is it worth it to devote resources to 
having the IRS manually investigate every social media post that 
suggests any hint of unreported income, no matter how small in dollar 
amount?21 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the growing 
trend for public agencies and private third parties to use social media, 
automation, and other tools of technology to monitor or collect 
information on individuals. It identifies concerns and tensions that arise 
from this trend. It then considers how a taxpayer’s statutory “right to 
privacy” applies in the context of information made available online by 
the taxpayer. While the taxpayer right to privacy is not clearly defined, 
it appears to refer to more than just the right of confidentiality of 
taxpayer information. Part II frames the issue of social media mining 
within broader reactions to punishing (or choosing not to punish) 
unsophisticated behavior and raises thoughts about how social media 
mining is different than investigating tips from whistleblowers. Part II 
then makes several proposals for the IRS to consider, starting with a 
call for the agency to provide the public with a clearer explanation of 
its understanding of the taxpayer “right to privacy.” Part III, proceeding 
under the assumption that the IRS can and will access social media for 
enforcement purposes,22 provides takeaways and thoughts for those 
attorneys who advocate on behalf of low-income taxpayers and 
represent them in their controversies with the IRS. 
I 
TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE COLLISION OF AUTOMATION, 
CONVENIENCE, PRIVACY, AND EXPECTATIONS 
Examples abound of federal and state agencies, as well as private 
third parties, using big data algorithms, automated systems, and other 
tools of technology (including, but not limited to, social media mining) 
to monitor or collect information on individuals. In some cases, 
21 This fits within broader questions of the appropriateness of leeway in law 
enforcement. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Falling Short in the Data Age (working paper) 
(on file with author) (“[I]ncreasing access to data and information will change the 
availability and shape of informal leeway in the law.”). 
22 While the primary focus of this Article is the possibility that the IRS may use social 
media at the examination and collections level, a recent Tax Court decision reveals the first 
known example of IRS Counsel using a social media post as evidence contradicting the 
petitioner’s filing position. James Creech, Oversharing on Social Media Reaches the Tax 
Court, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sept. 3, 2020) (citing Brzyski v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. 
Op. 2020-25 (Aug. 27, 2020)), https://procedurallytaxing.com/oversharing-on-social-media 
-reaches-the-tax-court/ [https://perma.cc/S99C-3B48].
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individuals consent knowingly as a matter of convenience. In other 
instances, individuals are unaware they are being surveilled. The 
motivations for tracking individuals and collecting such data are varied, 
with rationales ranging from national security to marketing of 
consumer products and many things in between. 
Section I.A first discusses some of the ways in which government 
agencies other than the IRS use technology to categorize or identify 
behaviors, and it then provides examples of how private third parties 
do so, including as a service to other individuals and, in some cases, 
the person being surveilled. Section I.A of the Article raises questions 
more than it provides answers: Where are we as a society with respect 
to privacy norms, and what is our comfort level with technological 
tracking? Under what circumstances do Americans seem to find it 
acceptable to sacrifice privacy (whether their own or that of others) as 
a means to achieve law enforcement, safety, or convenience? The 
examples used herein are intended to set a stage for how the public at 
large might feel about the IRS engaging in data mining for tax 
enforcement purposes.  
Section I.B addresses notions of tax and privacy, reflecting on how 
the IRS has historically used publicly available information and 
imagining how the use of social media mining may change or build 
upon that use. The RFI reveals that the IRS is currently researching 
third-party options for machine-driven data mining on publicly 
available data.23 When asked whether the government was interested 
in leveraging artificial intelligence-based technology to interpret text 
and image-based information on social media, the IRS responded that 
it “is open to any viable solution that fits our needs.”24 Thus, this 
Article imagines a variety of possibilities that might flow once the IRS 
opens the Pandora’s box that is social media.  
A. Is Our Collective Notion of Privacy Slowly Changing? Examples
Outside the Realm of Tax Administration 
As technology evolves, so too do norms and expectations. Public 
agencies and private companies alike use artificial intelligence, or AI, 
for a variety of predictive purposes. In some instances, predictive 
screening techniques may be employed by both government agencies 
and private industry in pursuit of the same goals, either in partnership 
23 IRS RFI, supra note 2. 
24 IRS, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, NO. 2032H8-RFI-MEDIA, ANSWER 31, IRS 
SUPPLIED RESPONSES TO VENDOR QUESTIONS (on file with author). 
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or in parallel. For example, both the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs and Facebook have created predictive tools for suicide 
screening and prevention.25 The use of artificial intelligence by 
government agencies may have different policy or privacy implications 
than the use by private companies, but there also may be overlap. With 
its RFI, the IRS signals an intention to partner with private industry. 
Thus, in thinking about how the IRS may use social media to mine for 
data, it is helpful to consider analogies drawn both from other 
government agencies and from private companies. 
1. Government Agency Use of Social Media Mining and Big Data
Federal and state government agencies engage in data mining in a
variety of ways and for a whole host of purposes.26 In their article 
addressing the IRS big data analytics program, Kimberly Houser and 
Debra Sanders reference a Senate report, noting that as of 2007 there 
were 52 different federal agencies using at least 199 different operating 
or planned data mining programs, including the IRS.27 Many of these 
programs involved counterterrorism and national security but also 
included efforts to improve agency service or performance, analyze 
scientific and research information, manage human resources, and 
detect fraud, waste, and abuse.28 
Government data mining fits within, or perhaps couples with, a 
larger trend of using automation to facilitate the administration of 
25 Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence-Based Suicide Prediction, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
SPECIAL ISSUE 98, 102 (2019). Marks divides the types of AI tools used for suicide 
screening into two categories: “medical suicide prediction,” which is undertaken within the 
healthcare system and involves the use of patient medical records, and “social suicide 
prediction,” which refers to tech companies scrutinizing data, including social media data. 
Id. at 104–05. Medical suicide prevention is subject to various regulatory regimes that 
govern the healthcare industry, including but not limited to the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act. Id. at 105. Marks explains that the social suicide prevention is more 
controversial in that it lacks accountability and transparency. Id. at 109. As a government 
agency, Veterans Affairs is able to engage in both types of categories of suicide prevention 
screenings, medical and social. Id. at 105. Tech companies, on the other hand, do not have 
access to medical records due to privacy laws, and engage only in social suicide prevention 
screenings. Id. at 107.  
26 As Houser and Sanders note, data mining can be predictive (meaning it analyzes and 
extrapolates data to make predictions about unavailable data) or descriptive (meaning it 
“summarizes properties of the data set”). Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 824. 
27 Id. at 825; Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government 
Data Mining Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 
(2007). 
28 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO 04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A 
WIDE RANGE OF USES 8 (2004). 
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social services to the public.29 While efficient, automation also has 
identifiable downsides for individuals. In her book Automating 
Inequality, Virginia Eubanks provides alarming examples of how 
automated systems, ranking algorithms, and predictive risk models 
affect the lives of the poor and working-class communities, including 
individuals with respect to their use of various public services.30 
Eubanks provides three in-depth case studies in her book: automation 
of state welfare eligibility, an electronic registry of unhoused 
individuals, and a risk model created to predict which children might 
become victims of child abuse or neglect.31 Eubanks notes that 
technologies are being integrated into social services “at a breathtaking 
pace, with little or no political discussion about their impacts,” and she 
observes ways in which they “intensif[y] discrimination” and 
disproportionately affect low-income communities.32 Eubanks notes 
that this digital trend is a modern continuation of the centuries-old ways 
in which the poor and working class are surveilled and stigmatized for 
being poor; she refers to this as the “digital poorhouse.”33 
Other scholars have identified similar concerns about the link 
between poverty and privacy. Using empirical data from a survey of 
low-income individuals, Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy, 
and Alice Marwick developed case studies of how big data tracking 
(including social media tracking) poses risks to the poor in the context 
of employment, access to higher education, and policing.34 
These observations by Eubanks, as well as Madden and her 
coauthors, reinforce my concern that low-income taxpayers may find 
themselves under disproportionate scrutiny relative to other taxpayers. 
As I describe in Section I.B, the IRS’s use of automated examination 
29 For a discussion envisioning how regulators might use big data to personalize or 
individualize outcomes, see Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield & Scott Duke 
Kominers, To Thine Own Self Be True? Incentive Problems in Personalized Law, 62 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
30 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 9 (2018) (“Digital tracking and decision-making systems 
have become routine in policing, political forecasting, marketing, credit reporting, criminal 
sentencing, business management, finance, and the administration of public programs.”). 
31 Id. at 10. 
32 Id. at 11–12. 
33 Id. at 12. 
34 Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and 
Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerability for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 54 
(2017). “In each setting, low-income Americans face not only adverse inferences drawn 
based on their personally identifiable information (which often is erroneous), but also those 
drawn from their social media and demographic networks.” Id. at 124. 
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techniques already disproportionately impacts the low-income 
taxpayer population.35 Further exacerbating my concern, social science 
research has found that lower-income individuals are “comparatively 
unlikely to restrict their social media activity’s visibility via privacy 
settings and are less hesitant to share sensitive information online.”36 
Thus the very nature of their social media use makes them vulnerable 
to disproportionate scrutiny. 
Inherent in concerns about the low-income populations is a concern 
about how these enforcement practices may impact taxpayers of 
different races. Scholars such as Dorothy Brown, Palma Joy Strand, 
Nicholas Mirkay, and Francine Lipman have identified structural ways 
in which income inequality and wealth inequality are racialized and 
how tax structures perpetuate or exacerbate these inequalities.37 
Ideally, the use of artificial intelligence and technology would be used 
to reduce inequality.38 However, much like humans, algorithms are 
susceptible to bias.39 Data privacy scholar Margaret Hu has argued that 
“algorithmically anchored” screening protocols are reminiscent of Jim 
Crow laws: the protocols may present on the front end as facially 
neutral while the results “may in fact have a disparate impact on 
traditionally protected classes.”40 Information studies scholar Safiya 
35 I have also addressed this phenomenon in my previous scholarship. See Michelle Lyon 
Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing 
Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113, 135 
(2013) (examining and rethinking the application of the accuracy-related penalty to 
unsophisticated and low-income taxpayers, particularly in the context of complex provisions 
granting social benefits, such as the EITC). 
36 Spencer Headworth, Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the 
Appropriation of Social Ties, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 189 (2019) (citing Madden et al., supra 
note 34). 
37 DOROTHY BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH 19–21 (2021) (describing how the 
persistent and widening black-white wealth gap is related to tax policy); see also Palma Joy 
Strand & Nicholas A. Mirkay, Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, and the U.S. System 
of Taxation, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 265, 265 (2020); Francine J. Lipman, Nicholas A. 
Mirkay & Palma Joy Strand, U.S. Tax Systems Need Anti-Racist Restructuring, 168 TAX 
NOTES FED., Aug. 3, 2020, at 855, 856. 
38 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 
1291 (2017) (positing that technology can be harnessed in ways that would deracialize 
policing, or at least make a “significant step in the right direction.”). 
39 Rumman Chowdhury & Narenda Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Oct. 24, 2018; see also Kristian Lum, Limitations of Mitigating Judicial Bias with 
Machine Learning, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV., No. 0141, June 26, 2017 (noting that judicial use 
of risk assessment tools in criminal cases are only as objective as how they are trained 
because machines will absorb the underlying human biases inherent in the data inputs), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0141.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C2H-DHAZ]. 
40 Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 645 (2017). Hu 
writes,  
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Umoja Noble’s recent book, Algorithms of Oppression, provides 
compelling examples of how algorithmic search engines discriminate 
against people of color, particularly women, and reinforce negative 
race and gender stereotypes.41  
Privacy experts express concern over many different ways in which 
government agencies use cutting-edge technology and artificial 
intelligence—not just social media—as surveillance tools,42 and the 
potential negative consequences to the public.43 As one example, 
without knowledge or consent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies are using 
facial recognition software to scan state driver’s license databases as a 
“routine investigative tool.”44 While the use of this has grown over 
time, a 2019 report revealed that facial recognition software 
Artificial intelligence and algorithms are not usually perceived as resulting in 
discrimination. In fact, they may appear to be equality-compliant or even equality-
enhancing in that algorithmic screening and vetting can be applied equally across 
entire populations and subpopulations. Screening and classification systems, 
however, even when facially neutral and algorithmically based, can lead to 
profound constitutional challenges.  
Id. at 650. 
41 SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES 
REINFORCE RACISM 17–18 (2018). As one of many examples, Noble describes her surprise 
when a Google search on her own computer using the term “black girls” retrieved results 
filled with pornography, despite the fact that her individual search history included 
engagement with Black feminist texts, videos, and books. Id. 
42 Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1736, 1744 (2015) (explaining 
how certain government programs screen the public through big data protocols to create a 
class of big data blacklisted individuals) (“Specifically, [Hu’s article] explains how, for 
example, matches and mismatches in big data systems can lead to inferential guilt that can 
directly or indirectly categorize individuals as administratively ‘guilty until proven 
innocent’ by virtue of digitally generated suspicion.”). 
43 Of airport facial scanning for security screening, technology columnist Geoffrey 
A. Fowler writes, “This has all the makings of a convenience trap. That’s how privacy-
invading technology—the stuff of China’s police state—creeps into American life.”
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don’t Smile for Surveillance: Why Airport Face Scans Are a Privacy
Trap, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology
/2019/06/10/your-face-is-now-your-boarding-pass-thats-problem/ [https://perma.cc/B63F
-MS44]; see also Shea Swauger, Software That Monitors Students During Tests Perpetuates
Inequality and Violates Their Privacy, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www
.technologyreview.com/2020/08/07/1006132/software-algorithms-proctoring-online-tests
-ai-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/R8BB-QWZC] (describing how algorithmic proctoring of
online exams, which includes a facial recognition component, can result in racial and gender
biases).
44 Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine 
for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are 
-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KL-4R2V].
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misidentified people of color more frequently than white people and 
misidentified women more frequently than men.45 In what has been 
described as a first known case (and a terrifyingly dystopian one at 
that), a Black man in Detroit was wrongfully arrested and detained for 
thirty hours based on an erroneous match from a facial recognition 
algorithm.46 Ironically, social media could have helped in this case: the 
man later realized he could have used his Instagram account to provide 
an alibi by showing he was elsewhere at the time the crime was 
committed.47 As a result of concerns about discrimination and the 
potential for false positives, a handful of localities have banned the use 
of such technology.48 In the wake of nationwide protests of police 
brutality following the killing of George Floyd, Amazon announced a 
one-year moratorium on the police use of Rekognition, the company’s 
facial recognition technology,49 and IBM announced that it “firmly 
opposes and will not condone” the use of such technology “for mass 
45 Drew Harwell, Federal Study Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial-Recognition 
Systems, Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 3:43 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial 
-bias-many-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use/ [https://perma.cc
/B3CR-DM5X] (“The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the federal
laboratory known as NIST that develops standards for new technology, found ‘empirical
evidence’ that most of the facial-recognition algorithms exhibit ‘demographic differentials’
that can worsen their accuracy based on a person’s age, gender or race.”); see also Natasha
Singer & Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are Biased, Says U.S. Study, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/facial-recognition
-bias.html [https://perma.cc/4QB4-69FL] (“The systems falsely identified African-
American and Asian faces 10 times to 100 times more than Caucasian faces . . . [a]nd falsely
identified older adults up to 10 times more than middle-aged adults.”).
46 Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https: 
//www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma 
.cc/L9D3-TDZZ]. While referring to this as the first known case of its kind, the article quotes 
Clare Garvie, a lawyer from the Georgetown University Center on Privacy and Technology 
who has written about concerns with facial recognition technology: “I strongly suspect this 
is not the first case to misidentify someone to arrest them for a crime they didn’t commit. 
This is just the first time we know about it.” Id. 
47 Id. In the proposals I set forth in Section II.C, I suggest the IRS might restrict its use 
of social media mining to constructive purposes, such as when the taxpayer requests it to 
resolve a dispute. 
48 Harwell, supra note 45 (stating that San Francisco and Oakland in California, and 
Somerville and Brookline in Massachusetts, passed bans in 2019 on facial recognition use 
by public officials, and the State of California banned the software’s use in police body 
cameras). 
49 Jay Greene, Amazon Bans Police Use of Its Facial-Recognition Technology for a 
Year, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology 
/2020/06/10/amazon-rekognition-police/ [https://perma.cc/S38P-A2K8]. 
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surveillance, racial profiling, [or] violations of basic human rights and 
freedoms.”50 
As to the appropriateness of government agencies using big data 
mining techniques, one might also draw a logistical distinction between 
civil and criminal investigations. One might more readily support the 
use of artificial intelligence, social media mining, and digital 
surveillance to investigate a crime, and I address this distinction in 
Section I.B. In some cases, a warrant may be required as a procedural 
safeguard prior to a search, but Fourth Amendment protections 
generally do not extend to government agents gathering information on 
social media.51 In this regard, social media use is similar to the 
countless ways in which we are all being monitored daily without a 
warrant: by security cameras in stores, by red-light cameras,52 and by 
email providers and internet servers. 
In many respects, we consensually (if unthinkingly) sacrifice our 
own privacy any time we leave the house.53 How, then, can anyone 
reasonably expect to have privacy rights in any of the information they 
post on Twitter, Instagram, or Facebook? It is true that those platforms 
offer a sliding continuum of privacy options; for example, one can 
choose to share Facebook posts only with those they have “friended” 
on Facebook. That said, we obviously lose control of information the 
instant we publish it even to a limited audience; for example, most 
people are cognizant that a private email or text sent to a friend, or a 
screenshot thereof, can be easily forwarded to an unlimited number of 
50 BBC News, IBM Abandons ‘Biased’ Facial Recognition Tech, BBC (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52978191 [https://perma.cc/6QZ6-K75R]. 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Gatson, No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22 (D.N.J. Dec. 
16, 2014) (holding that an undercover operation in which law enforcement created an 
undercover Instagram account and “friended” the suspect in order to view photos and other 
information that he posted to his account did not require a warrant). For a comprehensive 
discussion of privacy rights and social media posts, including a summary of Gatson and 
other relevant caselaw, see Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238, 240 (2018) (“An exploration of the 
extant case law shows that social media users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their social media postings—even if users communicate their information behind password-
protected pages.”). 
52 I. Bennett Capers cites red-light cameras and other technological innovations, coupled 
with access to big data, as other possible ways to make “policing more transparent, 
accountable, and egalitarian.” I. Bennet Capers, Techno-Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
495, 499 (2018). 
53 See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248 
(2008) (“[For example,] a person would have to be a hermit to be able to function in our 
society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal information to a vast array 
of public and private demanders.”). 
2021] #Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement 315
other people. And people, even those not on social media themselves, 
have no control at all over what others may post about them. 
In comparing the IRS to other government agencies, perhaps the 
most useful analogy would be to those agencies that administer social 
welfare benefits, such as the Social Security Administration and state 
departments of social services. I draw upon these examples in particular 
because Congress has chosen to use the IRS, and the tax filing process, 
to administer and deliver a number of social benefits to the public.54 
Most notable of these benefits is the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
a refundable tax credit paid to approximately 25 million low-income 
families each year as part of their income tax refund.55 Lawrence 
Zelenak has aptly described the EITC as “a welfare program that 
happens to be administered through the tax system”56 while also 
suggesting that because it is housed in the Internal Revenue Code, there 
is a higher tolerance for EITC overpayments than for general welfare 
overpayments.57 
Unlike the EITC, for which claimants self-certify, more traditional 
welfare benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP),58 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) are subject to 
verification procedures before the benefits are awarded. In addition, 
recipients of these benefits are also subject to investigation if fraud is 
suspected during or after receipt of the benefit.59  
This use of social media mining for investigating welfare fraud 
appears to be widespread among state and local agencies, in particular 
54 Over time, these benefits have included income-based refundable credits to working 
families, as well as expenditure-based refundable credits such as the First-Time Homebuyer 
Credit, the Adoption Tax Credit, the Premium Tax Credit, and a variety of education credits. 
Drumbl, Those Who Know, supra note 35, at 119–39. 
55 EITC Fast Facts, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/partner-toolkit/basic-marketing 
-communication-materials/eitc-fast-facts/eitc-fast-facts [https://perma.cc/MC72-CADU].
56 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Credit,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2005). Zelenak distinguishes the EITC from other welfare
programs, such as SNAP and TANF, because the EITC is predicated on earned income.
57 Id. at 1874. 
58 SNAP is the program formerly known as Food Stamps. U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., GAO 
14-641, SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ENHANCED DETECTION
TOOLS AND REPORTING COULD IMPROVE EFFORTS TO COMBAT RECIPIENT FRAUD, at 3
(2014) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM].
59 See Headworth, supra note 36, at 171 (“[F]ederal law requires state governments to 
maintain dedicated fraud control units . . . . These units are busy [and] primarily focus [on 
SNAP.]”). 
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for enforcement of SNAP eligibility.60 The Social Security 
Administration also has publicly acknowledged that its adjudicators 
use social media in evaluating cases and has stated it will consider 
expanding such use.61  
Sociologist Spencer Headworth describes how SNAP investigators 
manually search social media by viewing publicly available posts to 
gather information about household circumstances, such as who lives 
in the household, relationship status, and vacation photos.62 Some 
fraud investigations arise from social media posts that are less subtle: 
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services fraud 
investigators came across a social media post offering to trade “great 
organic marijuana” for an EBT card, leading to an arrest of an 
individual on both food benefit trafficking and drug charges.63 In other 
cases, social media leads originate from outside the agency: in 
Pennsylvania, a woman who offered on Facebook to trade her EBT 
card for cash was arrested after a member of the public tipped off the 
state’s fraud unit.64  
60 See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58 
(reviewing fraud detection tools used in eleven states, including both automated and manual 
monitoring of social media). 
61 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BUDGET ESTIMATES AND RELATED INFORMATION: FY 2020, 
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files/2020BO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH24-TCDY]. 
The Budget Overview states, 
Currently, agency adjudicators use social media information to evaluate a 
beneficiary’s symptoms when there is a [Cooperative Disability Investigation] 
unit’s Report of Investigation that contains social media data corroborating the 
investigative findings. In FY 2019, we are evaluating how social media could be 
used by disability adjudicators in assessing the consistency and supportability of 
evidence in a claimant’s case file. 
Id. at 26; see also Sarah Min, Social Security May Use Your Facebook and Instagram Photos 
to Nix Disability Claims, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/social-security-disability-benefits-your-facebook-instagram-posts-could-affect-your 
-social-security-disability-claim/ [https://perma.cc/R34V-6VFJ].
62 Headworth, supra note 36, at 187–88. Of his interviews with fraud enforcement
workers, “[s]ome investigators described Facebook as their most valuable tool, and some
saw it as much less useful.” Id. at 188.
63 Press Release, Want to Trade EBT Card for Marijuana?, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC.
& HEALTH SERVS. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sesa/office-communications
/media-release/want-trade-ebt-card-marijuana [https://perma.cc/55U5-U8N4]. Journalist
Kalena Thomhave took note of the way in which this specific press release “celebrated the
arrest” and how the press release “began ominously, ‘Note to would-be food benefits
traffickers. You’re being watched.’” Kalena Thomhave, Another Way to Police the Poor,
AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 11, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/another-way-police-poor/
[https://perma.cc/RZV9-RCFV].
64 Press Release, OIG Charges Williamsport Woman with SNAP Trafficking for Selling
Her Food Stamp Benefits on Facebook. She Exchanged Benefits for Heroin, PA. OFF. OF
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Some state agencies have tried using software programs as an 
automated tool for social media mining, with mixed results. The 
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) provided 
guidance to state agencies that wanted to set up such software to detect 
benefit trafficking on social media sites.65 A U.S. Government 
Accountability Office review of eleven states that experimented with 
that approach reported that only one state found the automated 
approach effective; the other states found the automated tools 
impractical (either because of technical difficulties or because of the 
high false positive rate) and preferred to devote their resources to 
manual searches.66 
As public policy student and freelance writer Kalena Thomhave 
explains, social media investigations are a modern-day continuation of 
the type of invasion of privacy endemic in welfare fraud 
investigations.67 Thomhave attributes this to the “dichotomy between 
those who are deserving and undeserving of public benefits, with the 
government as arbiter, [which] lies at the foundation of the American 
social safety net.”68 Though Thomhave’s remarks are directed at other 
agencies that administer social benefits and do not mention the IRS, 
one cannot ignore the fact that the EITC is part of the social safety net 
for working families and the fact that the IRS has identified the EITC 
as a targeted area of enforcement.69 This underscores my concern that 
the IRS may set its social media sights on EITC recipients, a concern I 
address in more detail in Section I.B. 
INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.media.pa.gov/Pages/inspector-general 
-Details.aspx?newsid=35 [https://perma.cc/U93P-EXDC]. In Section II.B, I discuss the IRS
Whistleblower program, and I raise the question of whether the IRS should encourage the
public to report tax-related social media posts to the agency.
65 SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58, at 23. 
66 Id. at 17 (“Our testing found the recommended e-commerce monitoring tool less 
effective than manual searches in detecting postings indicative of potential trafficking, and 
we found the tool for monitoring social media to be impractical for states due to the volume 
of irrelevant data.”). 
67 Thomhave, supra note 63 (“[I]n the 1960s, welfare officials would regularly make 
unannounced home visits (sometimes even ‘midnight raids’) to women receiving traditional 
cash benefits to see if they lived in accordance with welfare eligibility rules.”). While not 
referring specifically to social media mining, sociologist Spencer Headworth comments on 
loss of privacy: “Making their lives transparent and legible to state agencies is one way the 
poor pay for public assistance.” Headworth, supra note 36, at 172. 
68 Thomhave, supra note 63 (emphasis in original). 
69 See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Beyond Polemics: Poverty, Taxes, and 
Noncompliance, 14 EJOURNAL OF TAX RSCH. 253, 254 (2016) (identifying the high rate of 
improper payments as one explanation of the high audit rate of EITC returns). 
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2. Private Actor Use of Social Media Mining and Big Data
As noted, the use of artificial intelligence to screen individuals
extends beyond government agencies to the private sector, and some 
companies are using social media algorithms as a screening tool, just 
as the IRS seeks to do. One such online service company, Predictim, 
ceased operation after it faced backlash for its methods.70 Predictim 
had used AI to scan social media posts to assess babysitters’ 
personalities.71 This cyber-sleuthing service apparently appealed to 
some anxious parents worried about leaving their child with an 
unknown person; the company asserted that its algorithm could predict 
such things as a sitter’s risk of drug use, tendency to bully, or even a 
“bad attitude.”72 Predictim provided parents a risk rating based on the 
results of the algorithm, but the company did not explain how the 
algorithm arrived at that risk rating, and the results were not shared 
with the potential babysitter.73  
Though Predictim no longer offers this service, technology reporter 
Drew Harwell observes that this type of technology is increasingly used 
by companies in other types of hiring.74 Harwell notes that companies 
use such methods in recruiting, hiring, and reviewing their workers, 
“offering employers an unrivaled look at job candidates through a new 
wave of invasive psychological assessment and surveillance.”75 
Insurance companies are another class of private actor eager to 
utilize information from social media, whether as a tool to determine 
risk (and therefore premium rates) or to detect fraud.76 One 
70 Predictim halted its service after backlash from media publicity, including a 
Washington Post article, and after it was blocked by Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. 
Drew Harwell, AI Start-Up That Scanned Babysitters Halts Launch Following Post Report, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology 
/2018/12/14/ai-start-up-that-scanned-babysitters-halts-launch-following-post-report/ [https: 
//perma.cc/TN2K-3EDD]. 
71 Drew Harwell, Wanted: The ‘Perfect Babysitter.’ Must Pass AI Scan for Respect 
and Attitude, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/technology/2018/11/16/wanted-perfect-babysitter-must-pass-ai-scan-respect-attitude/ 
[https://perma.cc/WTB2-N7GQ] (“[Predictim uses] language-processing algorithms and an 
image-recognition software known as ‘computer vision’ to assess babysitters’ Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram posts for clues about their offline life.”). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (“[Tech firms sell to employers] artificial-intelligence systems that analyze a 
person’s speech, facial expressions and online history with promises of revealing the hidden 
aspects of their private lives.”). 
75 Id. 
76 Jessica Baron, Life Insurers Can Use Social Media Posts to Determine Premiums, as 
Long as They Don’t Discriminate, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes 
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commentator’s concern about insurance companies’ use of this practice 
could be generalized as an overarching concern that any type of social 
media mining can be potentially misleading.77 “If you’ve given up 
smoking but have old photos with cigarette in hand (or repost one of 
those popular Facebook Memories) how can a computer (or even an 
underwriter with a lot of work to do) properly assess the context of a 
photo?”78 Moreover, the image social media users cultivate online 
often does not portray real life. In turn, this can limit the value of the 
information obtained on social media and create time-consuming false 
positives for the agency or company engaging in the search.79 
People seem willing to tolerate and consent to privacy losses coupled 
with technology (often in connection with their smartphone) for a host 
of reasons, ranging from convenience to reassurance to rewards. 
Consider also the example of summer sleep-away camps offering a 
facial-recognition service, with an app sending the camper’s parents a 
notification the moment their child’s photograph is uploaded to its 
site.80 In 2019, the University of Alabama offered its students an 
incentive to opt into cell phone–based  location tracking because 
football coach Nick Saban did not like that students were leaving the 
stadium before games ended.81 The school created an app that students 
could download on their smartphone to verify that they attended and 
stayed at games for the full four quarters of the contest; those who did 
so accumulated reward points, which would be used to provide 




78 Id. In the context of life insurance, a cigarette represents a health risk for actuarial
purposes, as would certain hobbies such as skydiving or motorcycle riding. As other scholars
have noted, surveillance of poor people may focus on the use of cigarettes and alcohol, or
perhaps gambling. See EUBANKS, supra note 30, at 114 (discussing the example of Maine
Governor Paul LePage).
79 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
80 Drew Harwell, As Summer Camps Turn on Facial Recognition, Parents Demand: 




81 Alex Scarborough, Bama Tracking Students to Check 4-Quarter Stays, ESPN 
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/27608647/bama-tracking 
-students-check-4-quarter-stays [https://perma.cc/9NPQ-RYXZ].
82 Billy Witz, Orwellabama? Crimson Tide Track Locations to Keep Students at Games,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/sports/alabama-tracking
-app.html [https://perma.cc/KM9X-AAS6] (“Greg Byrne, Alabama’s athletic director,
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game the incentive was available, so many students opted in that the 
stadium’s network servers went down.83 
For better or for worse, these sorts of commercial uses of data 
mining and surveillance may have the effect of desensitizing people, 
especially younger generations, to the loss of privacy. But what is it 
that we should actually expect of our revenue agency, or of our federal 
government? The next section explores the taxpayer “right to privacy” 
and examines these issues through a tax-specific lens. 
B. What Is a Taxpayer’s Right to Privacy?
In 2015, Congress codified a Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR), 
which the Taxpayer Advocate refers to as a list of ten fundamental 
rights that taxpayers should be aware of when dealing with the IRS.84 
Internal Revenue Code (the Code) § 7803(a)(3) provides, “In 
discharging his duties, the Commissioner shall ensure that employees 
of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and act in accord with 
taxpayer rights as afforded by other provisions of this title,” and lists 
the ten rights. Number seven on the list is “the right to privacy.”85 
There is a separately enumerated taxpayer right to confidentiality 
(number eight on the list), which addresses how and with whom the 
IRS can share taxpayer information.86 By statutory implication, this 
means the right to privacy is more than just a right to have one’s tax 
information kept private from the public. 
In his literature review of contemporary scholarship on tax and 
privacy, Michael Hatfield categorizes the common characteristics that 
frame the scholarly conversation about privacy.87 With one notable 
exception that relates to low-income taxpayers and the privacy 
sacrifices they make in exchange for refundable tax credits,88 Hatfield 
said privacy concerns rarely came up when the program was being discussed with other 
departments and student groups.”). 
83 Id. Though not an Alabama fan or college student, my own teenage son told me he 
would gladly consent to such tracking in order to secure College Football Playoff tickets. 
84 I.R.C. § 7803; Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.irs.gov 
/taxpayer-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/UH33-R82A]. 
85 I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(G). I.R.C. § 6103 provides a detailed set of limitations on how 
and when the agency may disclose taxpayer information.  
86 I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(H). 
87 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 604–10. 
88 See Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 30–32 
(2013) (expressing concern that the EITC, like other social welfare programs, imposes a 
privacy burden on its recipients). As I discuss in the next section, this privacy burden 
2021] #Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement 321
finds that “privacy” scholarship focuses on protection from the 
disclosure of information (i.e., what the IRS can do with information it 
collects) rather than how we conceive of privacy limitations on the 
collection of information.89 Hatfield describes the Code’s privacy 
protections as “aim[ing] to maintain the confidentiality of taxpayer 
information”90 while noting that the IRS has authority “to collect any 
information relevant to the 145,000,000 individual income tax returns 
filed each year.”91 
If privacy and confidentiality are distinct rights and disclosure 
rules primarily protect confidentiality, then what exactly is meant by 
the “right to privacy?”92 At the time of this writing, there is no case 
law interpreting § 7803(a)(3)(G),93 nor are there Treasury Regulations 
providing formal administrative guidance on the various taxpayer 
rights.94 Adam Thimmesch, a tax scholar who has written about 
intersects with the fact that low-income taxpayers are disproportionately selected for audit 
when they claim the EITC. 
89 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 606; see also Adam B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 
TEMP. L. REV. 375, 375 (2018) (“The academic literature addressing privacy in the context 
of the U.S. tax system has generally discussed tax privacy as nothing more than a limited 
right of confidentiality.”). 
90 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 596. Hatfield points to § 6103, which generally provides 
that tax return information shall be kept confidential. Id. at 598. Hatfield notes that the IRS 
can collect any relevant information about taxpayers without probable cause of a crime or 
suspicion of a misstatement or understatement of any kind. Id. at 580. 
91 Id. at 580 (describing examples of cases in which the IRS reviewed medical records, 
love letters, family dynamics, reading habits, and other details of people’s private lives). 
Hatfield argues that tax scholarship “has not addressed the risks of excessive information 
collection.” Id. at 610. 
92 See Joshua P. Law, Balancing Efficient IRS Administration and Taxpayer Rights, 43 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 337, 348 (2019) (presenting a brief synopsis of the right to privacy 
in a note that was published after Hatfield’s literature review) (“The [taxpayer’s] right to 
privacy is ostensibly meant to guarantee taxpayers assurance that information about their 
financial situation will not be intruded upon without due cause; however, the IRS currently 
remains far from full compliance with this right.”). 
93 Courts have stated that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights does not create any new rights. See 
Moya v. Comm., 152 T.C. 182, 192 (2019) (“We think that the history of the IRS TBOR 
makes clear that it accords taxpayers no rights they did not already possess.”); Facebook v. 
IRS, No. 17-cv-06490-LB, 2018 WL 2215743, at *13 (N.D. Cal., May 14, 2018) (“The 
statutory TBOR enacted as part of the 2015 PATH Act did not grant new enforceable 
rights.”); Atl. Pac. Mgmt. Grp. v. Comm’r, 152 T.C. 330, 336 (2019) (“[S]ection 7803(a)(3) 
itself does not confer any new rights on taxpayers; it merely lists ‘taxpayer rights as afforded 
by other provisions of the Code.”). 
94 Whether taxpayer rights are even enforceable is also an open question. See Alice G. 
Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights: Window Dressing or 
Expression of Justice?, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 25, 27 (2018); Leandra Lederman, Is the Taxpayer 
Bill of Rights Enforceable? (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 404, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365777 [https://perma.cc/WCE9 
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privacy, refers to the TBOR’s statutory right to privacy as 
“aspirational,” insofar as the standard is loose and subjective, and there 
is no apparent remedy.95 
The IRS defines the right to privacy as follows: “Taxpayers have the 
right to expect that any IRS inquiry, examination, or enforcement 
action will comply with the law and be no more intrusive than 
necessary, and will respect all due process rights, including search and 
seizure protections, and will provide, where applicable, a collection due 
process hearing.”96 The IRS elaborates on the examination process as 
follows:  
The process of selecting a return for examination usually begins in 
one of two ways. First, we use computer programs to identify returns 
that may have incorrect amounts. These programs may be based on 
information returns, such as Forms 1099 and W-2, on studies of past 
examinations, or on certain issues identified by compliance projects. 
Second, we use information from outside sources that indicates that 
a return may have incorrect amounts. These sources may include 
newspapers, public records, and individuals. If we determine that the 
information is accurate and reliable, we may use it to select a return 
for examination.97 
As a starting point, then, query whether the IRS looking at public 
social media accounts or other publicly available online information 
would constitute a violation of a taxpayer’s right to privacy. It seems 
intuitive that if an individual makes information about him or herself 
-3PJ7]. But see T. Keith Fogg, Can the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Assist Your Clients?, 91
TEMP. L. REV. 705, 729 (2019) (arguing that the taxpayer’s right to privacy has a role in
examination cases with respect to a revenue agent seeking information from third parties,
and in collection cases with respect to the loss of privacy that results from the filing of a
notice of federal tax lien).
95 Thimmesch, supra note 89, at 392–93. Thimmesch observes that tax design must 
weigh privacy interests, whether those are described in neutral or normative terms, against 
potential information-collection harms (among other potential harms). Id. at 414. Building 
on the work of Daniel Solove, Thimmesch notes that “information-collection harms occur 
regardless of whether the information is collected through surveillance or through direct 
interrogation” and “regardless of whether the information is collected by the government or 
by a private actor.” Id. at 412 (citing Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477, 491–92 (2006)).
96 IRS, PUBL’N NO. 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER (Sept. 2017) (emphasis added),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7WQ-EG5C]. The right to 
confidentiality is described distinctly: “Taxpayers have the right to expect that any 
information they provide to the IRS will not be disclosed unless authorized by the taxpayer 
or by law.” Id. 
97 Id. 
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publicly available on such accounts, that individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to what has been posted.98  
To reiterate, the primary concern of this Article is not whether the 
IRS looking at social media violates the taxpayer’s right to privacy or 
whether the IRS has the right to access and use this information for 
enforcement purposes. I think the better question is whether, as a matter 
of social policy, it is appropriate and desirable, or even cost-effective, 
for the IRS to mine social media for civil enforcement purposes. As the 
prior section explained, other government agencies can and do access 
social media to investigate various types of benefits fraud. But most tax 
noncompliance does not constitute “fraud.”  
1. IRS Use of Data Analytics—Past and Future
The IRS has been using data analytics to address noncompliance
since long before Facebook and Instagram. Since the 1960s, the agency 
has used something called Discriminant Function (DIF) scoring to 
select returns for audit.99 The DIF score is a three-digit score assigned 
by a series of algorithms and models, the contents of which are not 
known outside the IRS.100 According to the IRS, the DIF “score rates 
the potential for [tax liability] change, based on past IRS experience 
with similar returns”—with a higher score more likely to be selected 
for examination.101 The DIF is used as a screening tool, and a return 
identified by a DIF score is manually classified by an “experienced 
[IRS] examiner” in order to screen for significant issues “worthy of 
exam.”102 
The examination selection process has evolved over time through 
the use of technology and automation, and over time these methods 
have increased the efficiency of audits by using data to identify returns 
98 Stacey Vanek Smith, When the IRS ‘Likes’ Your Facebook Update, MARKETPLACE 
(Apr. 14, 2014) https://www.marketplace.org/2014/04/14/when-irs-likes-your-facebook 
-update/ [https://perma.cc/KJQ9-UT38]. As tax scholar Edward Zelinsky remarked, “It’s
hard to believe that anybody who puts anything on Facebook has any legitimate expectation
of privacy.” Id.
99 See Carina Federico & Travis Thompson, Do IRS Computers Dream About Tax 
Cheats? Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Tax Enforcement and Compliance, J. TAX 
PRAC. & PROC., Feb.–Mar. 2019, at 43, 45; TOM GREENAWAY & ALEXANDRA DESANTIS, 
Taking the Mystery Out of Examinations—the Audit Process, in 1 EFFECTIVELY 
REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS 3-3 (Keith Fogg ed., 7th ed. 2018). 
100 GREENAWAY & DESANTIS, supra note 99, at 5; see also IRM 4.1.5.3.3.1(1) (Sept. 
21, 2020). 
101 I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-10 (Jan. 2006). 
102 IRM 4.1.5.3.3.1 (Sept. 21, 2020) (“Classifiers must use their skills, technical 
expertise, local knowledge, and experience to identify hidden, as well as obvious, issues.”). 
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more likely to be noncompliant.103 Other examples include the IRS 
automated underreporter program that matches returns with third-party 
reporting and the requirement implemented in 1987 to list identification 
numbers of dependents.104 The IRS also screens individual income tax 
returns using databases external to the agency to detect errors and 
noncompliance. For example, returns claiming the EITC are screened 
against the Dependent Database, which includes information from 
external sources.105 These returns are scored according to certain 
indicators, with a higher score suggesting a greater probability that a 
taxpayer may not meet the credit’s residency, relationship, or age 
eligibility requirements.106  
While the public does not know how DIF scores are calculated, or 
exactly what information is entered into the Dependent Database and 
from which sources, it stands to reason that the possibilities of social 
media data mining extend far beyond the traditional tools used for 
return screening.  
In their 2017 article, Kimberly Houser and Debra Sanders detail how 
the IRS is already engaging in data mining of public and commercial 
data pools, including social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, 
and Twitter, and using that information to run predictive algorithms.107 
In addition to raising procedural and due process concerns about this 
practice,108 Houser and Sanders also express a concern that the IRS’s 
use of such algorithms may result in discrimination.109  
103 See generally Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 828–33. 
104 Id. at 829; see also James Alm et al., New Technologies and the Evolution of Tax 
Compliance, 39 VA. TAX REV. 287, 312–13. 
105 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT, 3 SPECIAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 2020, at 5 n.26. (“The [Dependent Database] is a rule-based system 
incorporating data within the IRS and information from external sources such as the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration.”); see 
also IRM 4.19.14.1.1 (Dec. 7, 2017) (“Exam receives the majority of its EITC work from 
the Dependent Database [] and Electronic Fraud Detection System.”). 
106 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 105, at 27. The Dependent Database is 
referenced in IRM 4.19.14.8 (Apr. 4, 2019), but most of the details are redacted. 
107 Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 819–20. Houser and Sanders also detail other 
types of privacy breaches not discussed in this Article, including how the ACLU has found 
that the IRS purchased cell phone tracking technology and also discovered in 2013 that the 
IRS policy permitted the reading of private emails without a warrant (it has since agreed to 
stop doing so). Id. at 822–23. 
108 Id. at 843 (identifying ways in which the IRS data collection and analytics practices 
may violate the Administrative Procedures Act and/or due process protections). 
109 Id. at 848–50 (“[Algorithms] may result in targeting certain groups based on the 
associations created as the algorithm learns . . . . [And t]he New York Police Department 
came under fire for its use of predictive analytics to focus its policing on certain 
communities.”). But see generally I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 
2021] #Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement 325
My greatest concern, which Houser and Sanders do not specifically 
raise, is that data mining of social media sources will disproportionately 
impact low-income taxpayers. As I110 and others111 have highlighted 
elsewhere, low-income taxpayers are already disproportionately in 
the examination spotlight: in fiscal year 2018, the audit rate for all 
individual taxpayers was 0.59%; when broken down by level of 
adjusted gross income (AGI), a higher percentage of taxpayers with 
AGI between $1 and $25,000 were audited (0.69%) than those with 
AGI between $25,000 and $499,000.112 As the next section addresses, 
audits of low-income taxpayers are typically time-consuming, 
burdensome, and stressful. Taxpayers are asked to provide 
documentation substantiating fact-intensive questions, such as who 
lives in their household, what their relationship to those individuals is, 
and how much support the taxpayer provides to those individuals.113 
For low-income taxpayers, audits can pose an economic hardship for 
those cases in which the IRS freezes the valuable refundable credit 
portion of the refund until the audit is resolved.114 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) (advocating for the harnessing of surveillance technology to 
deracialize policing and describing the necessary redistribution of privacy). 
110 See MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL, TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR (2019). 
111 Kiel, supra note 19 (“[A]udits of the rich continue to plunge while those of the poor 
hold steady, and the two audit rates are converging . . . . [EITC recipients] are audited at a 
higher rate than all but the richest taxpayers.”). 
112 I.R.S., PUB. NO. 55B, DATA BOOK: 2018, at 27 (May 2019). At AGI levels above 
$500,000, the audit rate is higher, and the tiny number of the taxpayers at the highest end 
are subject to a sharply higher rate: the audit rate of taxpayers with AGI between $500,000 
and $1 million was 1.1%; taxpayers with AGI between $1 million and $5 million had an 
audit rate of 2.21%; taxpayers with AGI between $5 million and $10 million faced an audit 
rate of 4.21%, and 6.66% of taxpayers with AGI above $10 million were audited. Id. Note 
that taxpayers who reported no AGI were also subject to a higher than average audit rate 
(2.04%); this includes returns with losses, and a taxpayer with no AGI cannot claim EITC. 
Id. 
113 See I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 7703(b), 24, 32, 151 and accompanying Treasury Regulations 
(setting forth the eligibility requirements for head of household filing status, marital status, 
the child tax credit, the EITC, and the dependent exemption). These various eligibility 
requirements overlap imperfectly and can be particularly complicated to apply to 
multigenerational households and shared child custody situations. Examiners ask taxpayers 
to prove residence of individuals through the use of such documents as school records, 
medical or social service records, and court orders, if applicable. See, e.g., I.R.S. Form 886-
H-EIC (Oct. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f886he.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2LN-
YAKZ].
114 See infra text accompanying note 120. 
326 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 301 
2. Disproportionate Enforcement on Lower-Income Taxpayers, and
Implications for Taxpayer Privacy
The higher audit rate of these low-income taxpayers, relative to the 
moderate-income taxpayers, is due in part to the fact that the IRS 
prioritizes audits of returns claiming the EITC. In recent years, more 
than one in three individual income tax returns selected for examination 
involved an EITC claim.115 The EITC remains an enforcement priority 
for the IRS even as other types of examinations have declined and even 
though the overall number of returns with EITC claims has not 
increased in recent years.116 The IRS has been subject to criticism for 
shining the spotlight on the poor rather than the rich, as well as for the 
demographic consequences of this enforcement strategy.117 A former 
IRS economist who analyzed exam coverage data and estimated how it 
breaks down by county and state reported that taxpayers in the rural 
south are being audited at disproportionately high rates; according to 
his estimates, the ten most-heavily audited counties in the United States 
are disproportionately rural, low-income, and nonwhite.118  
115 In 2018, 37% of audited returns were selected on the basis of an EITC claim. I.R.S., 
PUB. NO. 55B, supra note 112, at 23–26. Table 9a shows that 150,043,227 individual 
income tax returns were filed; of this total, 892,187 were selected for audit, representing an 
overall individual income tax audit rate of 0.59% for FY 2018. Id. Of the 892,187 returns 
selected for audit, footnote 5 specifies that 330,359 (37%) were selected for audit on the 
basis of an EITC claim. Id. at 126 n.5. See also Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, Who’s 
More Likely to Be Audited: A Person Making $20,000—or $400,000?, PROPUBLICA  
(Dec. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/earned-income-tax-credit-irs-
audit-working-poor [https://perma.cc/HMP7-DDVR] (describing how EITC audits have 
increased as a proportion of audits over a period of time in which IRS resources have been 
reduced) (“[In FY 2016], the IRS audited 381,000 recipients of the EITC. That was 36 
percent of all audits the IRS conducted, up from 33 percent in 2011, when the budget cuts 
began.”). 
116 See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2019-30-063, TRENDS 
IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 15 (Sept. 9, 2019) (“Overall, 
the number of tax returns claiming the [EITC] have not increased over the past five years. 
At the same time, the number of examinations conducted by the [Wage & Investment] 
Division for returns claiming the [EITC] have increased by 17 percent, from 282,665 in FY 
2014 to 330,886 in FY 2018.”); see also George testimony, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that 
the IRS added 290 additional tax examiner positions, that tax examiners were the only 
position the IRS increased in 2018 and that correspondence examinations were the only 
types of examinations that the IRS increased in 2018. In contrast, the IRS has decreased the 
number of revenue agent positions; revenue agents conduct more complex examinations in 
the field).  
117 See, e.g., Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Where in the U.S. Are You Most Likely 
to Be Audited by the IRS?, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 1, 2019), https://projects.propublica.org 
/graphics/eitc-audit [https://perma.cc/JZ7F-EJLL]. 
118 Kim M. Bloomquist, Regional Bias in IRS Audit Selection, 162 TAX NOTES 987 
(Mar. 4, 2019) (discussing regional bias in audits for tax years 2012–2015 and highlighting 
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The majority of all examinations, and EITC examinations in 
particular, are correspondence examinations rather than in-person 
audits.119 Correspondence examinations, as the name suggests, are 
conducted through the mail. These examinations are highly automated 
and are not overseen by one specific employee from start to finish. In 
other words, the IRS uses an inefficient process to audit low-income 
taxpayers on an issue with fact-intensive and complex eligibility 
requirements. These audits are time-consuming to resolve, with the 
result that refunds of thousands of dollars are often delayed for 
months or longer.120 Further, these audits are often burdensome for 
taxpayers.121 Yet the IRS has justified this disproportionate focus on 
EITC claimants, citing resource constraints.122 At the same time, the 
IRS has faced criticism for not doing more to pursue high-income 
individuals who fail to file a tax return, even though pursuing nonfilers 
is also cost-efficient because of automation and the use of third-party 
information reporting.123 
that rural Humphreys County, Mississippi, with a median annual household income of just 
$26,000, had the highest rate of audit intensity, while also noting that the ten most heavily 
audited counties are all in the rural south and that in 2017 the population of these ten counties 
was 79% nonwhite (primarily African-American) according to the U.S. Census Bureau).  
119 Seventy-one percent of examinations conducted in FY 2017 were correspondence 
examinations, which is fairly typical. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 126 (2018), http://www.TaxpayerAdvocate.irs.gov/2018AnnualReport [https:// 
perma.cc/PWB6-Z3LM]. In the same year, approximately 72% of correspondence exams in 
the Wage & Income Division were EITC exams. Id. at 128. 
120 Most EITC exams occur prior to the issuance of the refund, with the result that the 
refund is frozen and the taxpayer does not receive the EITC until the audit is concluded in 
the taxpayer’s favor. Id. at 130, fig.1.8.3. Depending on household composition and income 
level, these refunds are often thousands of dollars, making them significant relative to the 
annual earned income of the household; low-income households rely on these refunds as a 
critical anti-poverty safety net. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. REP., THE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDIT (EITC): HOW IT WORKS AND WHO RECEIVES IT, R43805 (Jan. 12, 2021), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43805.pdf [https://perma.cc/33EY-LTPX]. 
121 Id. at 133 (citing lower education levels, reliance on tax return preparers, and 
language barriers as some of the challenges faced by EITC claimants upon audit). 
122 Describing how the IRS audits approximately 300,000 EITC returns a year, the 
agency’s website states, “EITC correspondence audits are the most efficient use of available 
IRS examination resources with the average time to complete the audit of 5 hours per 
return.” I.R.S. Update on Audits (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-update 
-on-audits [https://perma.cc/WL6P-VLB4].
123 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2020-30-015, HIGH-INCOME
NONFILERS OWING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ARE NOT BEING WORKED BY THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE (May 29, 2020) [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR REPORT]. As the
TIGTA report notes, the intentional failure to file federal income tax returns is a crime.
Id. at 1. But see I.R.S. News Release IR-2020-34 (Feb. 19, 2020) (announcing that revenue
officers would increase in-person visits to taxpayers with income of more than $100,000
who did not file returns in 2018 or previous years). IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig
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It should be noted that while EITC claimants are disproportionately 
in the IRS enforcement spotlight, recipients of this social benefit are in 
many respects perceived to be treated with more dignity than recipients 
of traditional welfare.124 Tax scholar Hayes Holderness describes the 
EITC as “far less privacy-invasive than either TANF or SNAP,” as both 
of those social benefit programs require precertification whereas the 
EITC does not.125 Moreover, as Zelenak describes, it is rare for the IRS 
to make a criminal referral for an individual EITC claimant; individuals 
who wrongfully claim the EITC usually face only civil sanctions.126  
3. Differing Policy Implications for the IRS Examination and
Collection Functions
The IRS RFI explicitly mentions the agency’s interest in using social 
media research tools for “existing compliance cases” and mentions 
collections as an end goal.127 Though it does not explicitly mention the 
potential use in examinations, it is not implausible that the IRS would 
consider using such tools to access social media in the context of both 
examinations and collections.  
While social media is a relatively new phenomenon, the IRS has 
long navigated criticism and limitations on the appropriate balance 
between taxpayer privacy and tax enforcement, including in 
examinations. In the early 1990s, the IRS acknowledged it had 
expanded the use of its “economic reality” investigations; whereas the 
indirect method technique was previously used only in criminal cases 
involving unfiled returns, the IRS extended its use of these so-called 
emphasized this initiative as a priority in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee 
in June 2020: “We continue working towards the goal of having a presence in every 
neighborhood, on each type of tax issue and at every level of income, to ensure fairness 
for all taxpayers.” 2020 Filing Season and COVID-19 Recovery: Before the S. Fin. 
Comm., 116th Cong. (June 30, 2020) (Testimony of Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, 
Internal Revenue Service), https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/2020-filing-season-
and-irs-covid-19-recovery [https://perma.cc/T6GR-VS8G]. 
124 See generally SARAH HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., IT’S NOT LIKE I’M POOR (2015) 
(recounting interviews with EITC recipients who speak to their perceptions); see also Sara 
Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients 
and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013). 
125 Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 30 (2013). 
126 To the extent that the IRS makes criminal referrals in connection with the EITC, it is 
most commonly in the context of tax return preparer fraud and promoters of fraudulent 
schemes, rather than individual claimants. Zelenak, supra note 56, at 1891–92. One might 
analogize return preparer fraud to social benefit trafficking. 
127 IRS RFI, supra note 2. 
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lifestyle audits to civil cases.128 Agents were trained to look for 
economic signs that taxpayers were living beyond their means, 
signaling possible unreported income.129 Tax professionals 
complained that the audits were arbitrary, blurred the lines between 
civil examinations and criminal investigations, and involved intrusions 
into taxpayer privacy.130 Congress subsequently enacted § 7602(e), 
which limited the circumstances under which the IRS could use this 
technique.131 While § 7602(e) seemingly gave taxpayers a new defense 
and even an opportunity to invoke a due process right, the statute 
provides only that the IRS must show it had a “reasonable indication” 
of a “likelihood” of unreported income. The relatively thin caselaw on 
§ 7602(e) suggests that the IRS has had little trouble in meeting this
standard to justify its use of lifestyle audits when challenged by
taxpayers.132 In its internal legal advice interpreting § 7602(e), the
Office of Chief Counsel advised IRS revenue agents that they may
drive by a taxpayer’s house, or may conduct a Lexis search to ascertain
if the taxpayer purchased real estate in a year at issue, prior to having a
reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of unreported income.133
All this raises the question: If the IRS decides to pursue the use of 
social media in both examinations and collections, should it develop 
different policies and guidelines for the use of social media by these 
distinct functions? 
128 Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Cheats Beware: The IRS Will Now Audit Lifestyles, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 6, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1994/11/06/tax 
-cheats-beware-the-irs-will-now-audit-lifestyles/1c220596-4ee3-4ec3-80cb-b06a0e443c32/
[https://perma.cc/T6GR-VS8G].
129 See, e.g., Philip R. Fink & Charles Gibson, Less Reason to Be Afraid?, CPA J. (June 
1999), http://archives.cpajournal.com/1999/0699/features/f46699.html [https://perma.cc 
/6NC9-UU2E]. 
130 Id.; Barbara Whitaker, Spending It; When the I.R.S. Agent Peeks Under the Mattress, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/business/spending-it 
-when-the-irs-agent-peeks-under-the-mattress.html [https://perma.cc/J648-GH74].
131 I.R.C. § 7602(e) (“The Secretary shall not use financial status or economic reality
examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer
unless the Secretary has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported
income.”).
132 See, e.g., Hsu v. United States, No. 17-cv-06656 NC, 2018 WL 2234439 (N.D. Cal.
May 16, 2018); Mortland v. IRS, No. A-03-CA-115-SS, 2003 WL 21791249 (W.D. Tex.
June 24, 2003); United States v. Abramson-Schmeiler, No. 09-cr-00359-REB, 2010 WL
11537887 (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2010); Chapin v. IRS Agent, No. 2:14-cv-538-EJL-REB, 2016
WL 383135 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2016).
133 I.R.S. Assoc. Chief Couns. Mem. 200101030 (Oct. 25, 2000) (concluding that these
specific practices would not constitute “an intrusion on a taxpayer”).
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The IRS examination function and the IRS collection function each 
play a role in enforcement. As there are slight distinctions in their 
mission, each function’s use of social media mining and big data 
algorithms might have different implications.134 IRS policy states that, 
in selecting returns for examination,  
[t]he primary objective . . . is to promote the highest degree of
voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers. This requires the
exercise of professional judgment in selecting sufficient returns of all
classes of returns in order to assure all taxpayers of equitable
consideration, in utilizing available experience and statistics
indicating the probability of substantial error, and in making the most
efficient use of examination staffing and other resources.135
The IRS has a separately stated set of policy considerations for 
collections, which also emphasizes that “enforcement is a necessary 
component of a voluntary assessment system.”136 Unlike in the 
examination context, taxpayers have additional rights and protections 
in the collections context, some of which are statutory137 and some of 
which are a function of IRS policy.138 For example—and of critical 
importance to low-income individuals—the IRS cannot pursue forced 
collections through levy if doing so will create an economic hardship 
for the taxpayer.139 In addition to statutory notice and due process 
requirements, there are additional checks and balances in the collection 
process. For example, by statute, the IRS cannot seize the taxpayer’s 
principal residence without the approval of a U.S. district court judge 
or magistrate.140 
134 Recall that the RFI references using social media mining tools only with respect to 
collections and explicitly mentions that it would limit the use to open cases. See supra note 
2. I include both examination and collections in this discussion in light of Houser and
Sanders’ concerns about how the IRS is using its big data database. See Houser & Sanders,
supra note 14, at 870.
135 IRM 1.2.1.5.10 (June 1, 1974). 
136 IRM 1.2.1.6.1 (August 18, 1994). 
137 See I.R.C. §§ 6300–44, which includes notice and demand requirements and 
collection due process rights related to the imposition of liens and levies. 
138 See, e.g., IRM 5.11.7.2.1.1(2)(e) (Sept. 23, 2016); I.R.S., Dir. of Collection Inventory 
Delivery and Selection Mem. SBSE-05-1015-0067 (Oct. 7, 2015) (notifying IRS Field 
Collection agents of a policy decision to exclude social security disability insurance 
payments from the automated levy program, even though § 6331(h) provides the IRS the 
statutory authority to levy those benefits).  
139 I.R.C. § 6343(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) (as amended in 2005) (defining 
economic hardship as a taxpayer being unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses). 
140 I.R.C. § 6334(e). Section 6334(a)(13) additionally provides that any real property 
used as the taxpayer’s residence is exempt if the amount of the levy does not exceed $5,000. 
See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(d). 
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The IRS Policy Statement on “Fairness and Integrity in Enforcement 
and Collection” states three primary goals: (1) to ensure fairness to the 
taxpaying public; (2) to ensure an equitable process for all taxpayers; 
and (3) to ensure fairness to each taxpayer.141 The policy further 
describes how it aims to ensure an equitable process: “[F]airness and 
integrity are built into the foundation of our enforcement selection 
processes. These processes operate under a comprehensive set of 
checks and balances and safeguards to identify the highest potential 
noncompliance, using scoring mechanisms, data driven algorithms, 
third party information, whistleblowers and information provided by 
the taxpayer.”142 We should expect the IRS to pursue collection where 
necessary to promote compliance, but it must take measures to avoid 
undue hardship to the taxpayer.143  
As one way of balancing these enforcement goals with taxpayer 
rights, Section II.C proposes that the IRS clarify its conception of the 
taxpayer right to privacy to the public. The agency should be 
transparent to the public about its use (if any) of social media, so that 
taxpayers are on notice that the IRS is watching. It is hard, if not 
impossible, to predict what compliance impact would result from 
taxpayers knowing that the IRS is monitoring their social media.144 
However, putting taxpayers on notice of this intention affords them 
dignity.145 
141 I.R.S. Policy Statement 1-236 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
142 Id. 
143 See, e.g., IRM 1.2.1.6.5 (July 10, 1959); IRM 1.2.1.6.14 (Nov. 19, 1980). 
144 There is a rich literature on theories of tax compliance. See, e.g., Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and 
Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOC., 2 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 138 (2007). One theory of tax compliance is economic 
deterrence, which is the idea that taxpayers who perceive that the IRS is likely to catch tax 
cheats will be deterred from cheating. However, studies suggest that deterrence is not the 
strongest driver of tax compliance: other compliance motivations include social norms, tax 
morale, trust in government, convenience, and reliance on tax preparers. Id.  
145 Arguably, it also affords taxpayers who engage in noncompliance a warning to 
cultivate their social media in a way that does not publicly tip off the IRS while continuing 
to engage in such noncompliance. On the other hand, if everyone on social media cultivates 
their online image with this in mind, with the effect that no one on social media brags about 
cheating on their taxes, might this boost tax morale? These questions are worthy of research, 
but beyond the scope of this Article. 
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4. Differing Policy Implications for Civil Tax Enforcement and
Criminal Tax Enforcement
Just as there ought to be different considerations for examination and 
collections, there should be different considerations in place for civil 
proceedings and criminal investigations. As a policy matter, it may be 
more justifiable for the IRS to engage in social media mining (along 
with other use of artificial intelligence) to determine whether a criminal 
act has been committed.146 The IRS Criminal Investigations unit has 
far fewer employees than the civil enforcement side,147 and its smaller 
workforce has a broader scope that includes not just tax fraud but also 
money laundering and narcotics-related and counterterrorism-related 
financial crimes.148 Don Fort, chief of the IRS Criminal Investigations 
unit, has spoken publicly about how his office is using “advanced data 
analytics to spot suspicious behavior,” specifically mentioning his 
office was using data analytics to investigate noncompliance with 
payroll tax laws.149 The need for this stems in part from the agency’s 
decrease in staffing.150 Fort has also made public remarks about 
unreported capital gains related to cryptocurrencies as an emerging area 
of focus and said that there are whistleblower cases they are actively 
working; he cited cryptocurrencies as an area of concern because of the 
lack of transparency and visibility in those transactions.151  
146 See generally Alm et al., supra note 104 (discussing ways that technology may both 
improve and subvert tax compliance, including in the criminal tax context). 
147 In fiscal year 2018, examinations and collections had 30,876 full-time equivalent 
positions. IRS, DATA BOOK 2018 at 67, tbl.30 (2018). In contrast, there were 2,019 special 
agent positions in the Criminal Investigations unit in fiscal year 2018. IRS, IRS:  
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl 
/2018_irs_criminal_investigation_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR3W-K5PA]. 
148 IRS, IRS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018). 
149 Kristin Broughton, Tax Crime Enforcement Unit Relying More on Analytics to Spot 
Crime, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-crime 
-enforcement-unit-relying-more-on-analytics-to-spot-crime-11560363826 [https://perma.cc
/JC7V-KHTW].
150 Id. (noting that the IRS Inspector General reports the IRS has 26% fewer special 
agents than it did in 2012); see also Michael Cohn, IRS Criminal Investigation Leveraging 
More Data Analytics, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 14, 2018, 12:29 PM), https://www.accounting 
today.com/news/irs-criminal-investigation-leveraging-more-data-analytics-to-probe-tax 
-fraud [https://perma.cc/PW5S-B6VU] (“One reason why the division needed to rely so
much on data analytics was to make up for the shortage of special agents, while helping IRS
agents identify the cases that would have the most impact.”).
151 Broughton, supra note 149. The IRS Criminal Investigation unit is devoting 
significant resources to cryptocurrency investigations. See Federico & Thompson, supra 
note 99. 
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Perhaps it is inevitable that the IRS will increasingly utilize artificial 
intelligence techniques in criminal investigations, and perhaps the 
public at large will not find the use of such techniques objectionable in 
this context. If we embrace this as acceptable, where might this 
ultimately take us? Will the IRS use facial recognition techniques to 
track where taxpayers are going and to monitor their cash purchases?152 
Where, as a society, do we want this to end? And do we want this 
technology to be applied to all taxpayers and to all potential tax-related 
issues, both big and small?153  
II 
PUNISHING THE UNSOPHISTICATED: PONDERING BRAGGADOCIO, 
WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND THE QUEST TO CLOSE THE TAX GAP 
This Article is not meant to deny or undermine the importance of tax 
compliance or IRS enforcement efforts. The IRS estimates there is a 
relatively high and steady rate of voluntary tax compliance, most 
recently estimated at approximately 83.6%.154 The term “tax gap” 
refers to the amount of tax not paid voluntarily and timely and refers to 
three distinct types of noncompliance: nonfiling, underreporting, and 
underpayment.155 The IRS uses noncompliance estimates and research 
programs to inform its enforcement strategies. For example, there is a 
well-established correlation between information reporting and 
compliance, and there is a well-known compliance gap correlating with 
the cash economy due to the lack of information reporting. Underlying 
the goal of reducing the tax gap (as well as underlying the RFI) are 
152 EUBANKS, supra note 30, at 7 (citing the example of Maine Governor Paul LePage 
having his administration mine data and publicly release information about welfare 
recipients who withdrew cash from ATMs in smoke shops, liquor stores, and out-of-state 
locations). 
153 According to TIGTA, “[i]n the past, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has focused 
on the tax compliance of high-income individuals because their noncompliance can have a 
significant corrosive effect on tax administration.” TREASURY INSPECTOR REPORT, supra 
note 123, at 1. This is not to argue that the IRS should ignore small indiscretions, but given 
the agency’s high focus on EITC enforcement, it ought to use technology to increase its 
efforts at reducing high-dollar noncompliance. To see the proposal I set forth for this, see 
my discussion in Section II.C.5. 
154 IRS, PUBLICATION 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 1 (2019). This figure is the voluntary 
compliance rate, which is a measurement of the gross tax gap; the net compliance rate, which 
includes amounts that are eventually paid, including through enforcement and collection 
measures, is a slightly higher figure (85.8% in latest report). 
155 Id. at 4. 
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questions about how to most efficiently allocate limited resources in 
maximizing tax compliance. 
For some, it may be easy to shrug off a call to protect the privacy of 
people who voluntarily make public the intimate (and often mundane) 
details of their private life. Section II.A addresses that temptation and 
raises examples of when and why it might be unfair, unwise, or 
inefficient to incorporate social media mining for tax enforcement. A 
distinction can and should be made between blatant public admissions 
of fraudulent behavior, on the one hand, and subtleties perceived by 
possibly discriminatory algorithms that may lead to significant false 
positives. As to blatant admissions, Section II.B explores the question 
of whistleblowers and whether the IRS should expressly encourage 
third parties to report potential fraud based on social media postings. 
This part then concludes in Section II.C with several suggested 
policy proposals for the IRS, including a call for the IRS to clarify its 
understanding of a taxpayer’s “right to privacy” for the public. 
A. The Temptation to Disregard Individual Privacy Concerns
One response to this Article can be couched in the words of the 
fictional character Forrest Gump: “Momma says stupid is as stupid 
does.”156 In other words, people may intuitively respond to the IRS RFI 
with a shoulder shrug: if taxpayers are foolish enough to get caught 
doing something wrong, why is that necessarily bad? And if they are 
bragging about illegal behavior publicly on the internet, why do they 
deserve sympathy or leniency?157 
As one unsympathetic example of internet braggadocio, consider 
John McAfee, the British American businessman who founded the 
McAfee Associates software company. McAfee, a self-described 
Libertarian who unsuccessfully ran for President in 2016, is a 
multimillionaire who has publicly stated that he is a nonfiler.158 I would 
be surprised if this fact had been previously unknown to the IRS—
presumably at least some of his income is subject to third-party 
156 FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994). 
157 Note that this dovetails with one of the major critiques of privacy rights: that “those 
with nothing to hide have no reason to be concerned for privacy.” Hatfield, supra note 14, 
at 591 (evoking arguments made by Judge Richard Posner and Catherine MacKinnon). 
Several people I have spoken to about this Article had that reaction as well. 
158 Brooker Crothers, John McAfee Is Running from U.S. Authorities – and Running for 
President. On a Boat., FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/john 
-mcafee-is-running-from-u-s-authorities-and-running-for-president-on-a-boat [https://perma
.cc/WQ7D-LGQZ].
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information reporting,159 and the IRS would easily determine if no 
return had been filed in a given year. Of course, it is the height of hubris 
to brag about this publicly on Twitter, as McAfee did:160  
I have not filed a tax return for 8 years. Why? 1: taxation is illegal. 
2: I paid tens of millions already and received Jack Shit in services. 
3. I’m done making money. I live off of cash from McAfee Inc. My
net income is negative. But i [sic] am a prime target for the IRS. Here
I am.
According to McAfee, he has told the IRS, “I am not filing a return, 
I have no intention of doing so, come and find me.”161 Though the IRS 
has not publicly confirmed this, McAfee claims that in January 2019 
the IRS convened a grand jury to charge him, his wife, and four 
campaign workers “with unspecified IRS crimes.”162
Another unsympathetic example of such public bluster is Rashia 
Wilson, the self-declared “First Lady” and “Queen of Tax Fraud.”163 
Wilson pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of 
aggravated identity theft in connection with charges that she filed false 
federal income tax returns using fraudulently obtained social security 
numbers.164 According to news reports, Wilson “taunted police by 
posting photos of herself flashing stacks of cash”165 and posted 
inflammatory statements online, including: “I’M RASHIA, THE 
QUEEN OF IRS TAX FRAUD . . . I’m a millionaire for the record, so 
if U think indicting me will B easy it won’t, I promise you!”166 
159 The Internal Revenue Code imposes an information reporting requirement on certain 
third-party payors. See I.R.C. § 6031. The list is voluminous and includes payors of rents, 
royalties, wages, and sales or redemptions of securities. IRS research analysts have 
consistently found a relationship between third-party information reporting and tax 
compliance. See IRS, PUBLICATION 1415, supra note 154, at 13. 
160 John McAfee (@officialmcafee), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://twitter 
.com/officialmcafee/status/1080953136985133062?s=21. 
161 Crothers, supra note 158. 
162 Id. 
163 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Middle Dist. of Florida, “Queen of Tax Fraud” 
Resentenced to 21 Years in Prison (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr 
/queen-tax-fraud-resentenced-21-years-prison [https://perma.cc/E3CL-6RBA].  
164 Wilson’s federal indictment included fifty-seven counts. See U.S. v. Wilson, 593 F. 
App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 649 F. App’x 827 (11th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1064 (2017). 
165 Susan Taylor Martin, From the ‘Tax Fraud Queen’ to the $980,000 Refund, Tampa 
Bay Is a Hotbed of Tax Scammers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www 
.tampabay.com/business/from-the-tax-fraud-queen-to-the-980000-refund-tampa-bay-is-a 
-hotbed-of-tax-scammers-20190222/ [https://perma.cc/QXM9-RYPD].
166 Robert W. Wood, Queen of Tax Fraud Gets 21 Year Prison Term — for the Second
Time, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/03
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Neither McAfee nor Wilson is a low-income taxpayer who engaged 
in a small amount of cheating or made a small mistake. Wilson was 
sentenced to twenty-one years in her plea bargain and was ordered to 
forfeit over $2,000,000 in stolen proceeds.167 McAfee was indicted in 
October 2020 for tax evasion and willful failure to file tax returns.168  
It is understandable that some would take a just deserts approach: 
the idea that those who (like McAfee and Wilson) post things publicly 
are inviting scrutiny and deserve what they get. Indeed, Americans 
seem to enjoy stories of stupid criminals and human folly.169 These 
stories proliferate on blogs, in news media, and in books.170 It stands 
to reason, therefore, that people may enjoy stories of taxpayers “dumb” 
enough to tip their tax hand to the IRS on social media.171 In my view, 
our government agencies should resist the apparently very human urge 
to laugh at human misjudgment. Our revenue agency ought to direct its 
resources toward serious and systemic tax evasion and toward reducing 
the tax gap. 
I do not find McAfee or Wilson to be sympathetic examples either; 
while both cases involve social media bragging, they run much deeper 
than that. My privacy concerns do not extend to those who choose to 
use social media to openly taunt the IRS or encourage the shirking of 
/06/queen-of-tax-fraud-teasing-i-cant-be-caught-gets-21-years-prison-for-the-second-time 
/#791bcc0a4d15 [https://perma.cc/PDD5-2ZZY]. 
167 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., supra note 163. 
168 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., John McAfee Indicted for Tax Evasion (Oct. 5, 
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/john-mcafee-indicted-tax-evasion [https://perma.cc 
/6GWA-AFEB]. McAfee was arrested in Barcelona, Spain, as he was getting ready to board 
a flight to Istanbul. Following his arrest, McAfee tweeted from prison: “I am charged with 
tax fraud but my only crime is refusing to file returns - a misdemeanor. Fraud is lying on 
your tax returns. How could I have lied if I have said nothing?” John McAfee 
(@officialmcafee), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/officialmcafee 
/status/1315004213638897665. 
169 See, e.g., DARWIN AWARDS, http://darwinawards.com/rules/ [https://perma.cc/333W 
-5QK9]. The Darwin Awards is a “humor” site and a community effort published by Wendy
Northcutt, who has compiled the stories into a book series titled “The Darwin Awards”
(Dutton Books). Id. At the time of this writing, there were four books in the series. The
Darwin Awards website states, “One should not be ashamed of laughing over the misfortune
of others.” Id.
170 See, e.g., TOM NICK COCOTOS, WEIRD BUT TRUE! STUPID CRIMINALS: 150 
BRAINLESS BADDIES BUSTED, PLUS WACKY FACTS (2012); Andy Simmons & Priscilla 
Torres, The Fifteen Unluckiest Dumb Criminals Ever, READER’S DIG. (Sept. 18, 2019), 
http://www.rd.com/funny-stuff/dumb-criminals-unlucky/ [https://perma.cc/8BES-ZVDJ]. 
171 Similarly, the state of Washington made an example of the individual who publicly 
posted an offer to trade marijuana for EBT cards. WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH 
SERVS., supra note 63. All three of these examples (McAfee, Wilson, and the EBT trader) 
involve criminal acts rather than civil infractions. 
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tax obligations. The IRS would ignore this behavior at its own peril, as 
researchers find a strong link between tax compliance and tax 
morale.172 If taxpayers view tax evasion taunts on social media and 
believe that those individuals are “getting away with it,” that 
undermines goals of tax compliance.173 
Moreover, any criminal investigations of these two individuals 
likely did not emanate from the internet bragging—rather, the bragging 
(or taunting) seems to have come after the individuals were under 
scrutiny by the authorities. My concerns are with much more subtle 
social media users. For example, ordinary photos scanned by an 
algorithm might prompt an audit; the algorithm might predict that, 
based on these photos, an individual earns more money than he or she 
reported, or that a child does not live in the taxpayer’s house for the 
period required in connection with a particular credit that he or she 
claimed. 
In addition to my concern that the use of social media mining might 
disproportionately harm low-income taxpayers, I wonder if the 
agency’s choice to engage in social media mining might impact certain 
personality types of taxpayers more than others. For example, it seems 
that social media mining would likely locate individuals who engage 
in bluster, targeting for scrutiny those who are loud, flashy, or 
indiscreet, even though those individuals’ tax compliance may be no 
better or worse than quiet individuals. Another concern is that it might 
punish those who are cultivating a false image of themselves online.174 
In a survey of 2000 British social media users, more than 75% of people 
admitted to lying about themselves on Twitter and Facebook.175 There 
is a rich body of social science literature examining how and why 
172 See Kornhauser, supra note 144, at 139 (“Higher tax morale correlates with 
higher tax compliance.”). Kornhauser’s article provides an extensive bibliography of tax 
compliance literature. 
173 Kornhauser notes that “[n]on-compliance among other taxpayers can decrease an 
individual’s own tax morale and compliance.” Id. at 139–40 (citing Bruno S. Frey & Benno 
Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007)). 
174 Houser and Sanders address the problem of potentially false data in their article. See 
Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 841–42 (citing Minas Michikyan, Jessica Dennis & 
Kaveri Subrahmanyam, Can You Guess Who I Am? Real, Ideal, and False Self-Presentation 
on Facebook Among Emerging Adults¸ 3 EMERGING ADULTHOOD 55, 60 (2015)). 
175 Lisa Vaas, Over 75% of People Lie on Social Media, NAKED SECURITY: SOPHOS 
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/04/07/over-75-of-people-lie-on-social 
-media/ [https://perma.cc/QB3T-T8EM] (finding men more likely to lie on social media than
women, with 43% of men polled admitting to fabricating facts about themselves); see also
Cortney S. Warren, How Honest Are People on Social Media?, PSYCH. TODAY (July
30, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/naked-truth/201807/how-honest-are-
people-social-media [https://perma.cc/WL8W-KFBC] (describing the same British survey).
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people lie online, as well as perceptions of how often other people 
lie.176 
This tendency for people to lie or exaggerate surely spans all ages, 
but there appears to be a generational element to it as well. Social 
scientists have found that young adults “with a less coherent sense of 
the self and lower self-esteem reported presenting their false self on 
Facebook to a greater extent.”177 Whether young or old, people may 
have a wide variety of incentives and motivations to cultivate a false 
online image. They may post pictures of someone else’s expensive car. 
In some cases, a photo may not tell the full story. For example, a low-
income individual may post photos of a vacation at an expensive resort, 
which might suggest to the IRS that the individual has significant 
disposable income—but perhaps this individual’s parents paid for the 
entire trip. Do we want an algorithm to point the IRS in these directions, 
forcing individual taxpayers to prove that someone else took them 
someplace expensive and paid their way?  
In this regard, it is likely data mining will pick up false hits and 
minor indiscretions that will direct the IRS down a path that is 
either negligible (in the case of a low-income taxpayer who has 
committed a relatively minor tax indiscretion, either intentionally or 
unintentionally) or useless (in the case of those presenting a false image 
or those posts that the algorithm misinterprets).178 Other government 
agencies that engage in social media investigations have cited this as a 
downside of using automated tools.179 Thus, it is foreseeable that the 
IRS’s use of automated mining may necessitate the resource-intensive 
manual review of many accounts that turn out to be false hits or not 
worth pursuing; in that regard, it is possible that automation may not 
be as cost-saving as one would assume. Kimberly Houser and Debra 
Sanders raised similar concerns about the accuracy of IRS data mining, 
noting, “big data results are based on correlation, not causation, and it 
is inappropriate to judge people based on correlation; just because 
176 See, e.g., Michelle Drouin et al., Why Do People Lie Online? “Because Everyone 
Lies on the Internet,” 64 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 134 (2016) (examining online deception 
across four different online venues, including social media). 
177 Michikyan et al., supra note 174, at 55. 
178 The IRS RFI mentions this possibility, though does not elaborate on how it would 
prevent it: “the IRS will also be mindful that frequently information posted on social media 
and the internet may be wrong or misleading.” IRS RFI, supra note 2.  
179 See SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 58, at 23 
(“[O]fficials in one state noted that the automated tools have placed an excessive demand 
on staff because they had to sift through the many false-positive leads that were generated.”). 
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people share characteristics or interests does not mean that they will 
have similar tax compliance behavior.”180  
Returning to the example of Predictim, the now-defunct online 
service that used artificial intelligence screening to create a predictive 
profile of potential babysitters, computer-generated scans sometimes 
produce ambiguous results. “When one babysitter’s scan was flagged 
for possible bullying behavior, the unnerved mother who requested it 
said she couldn’t tell whether the software had spotted an old movie 
quote, song lyric or other phrase as opposed to actual bullying 
language.”181 Similarly, Facebook has worked to fine-tune its social 
suicide prediction screening: Mason Marks cites the example of how in 
its early efforts Facebook picked up false positives from likely benign 
social media posts such as “Ugh, I have so much homework I just 
wanna kill myself.”182 
At the same time, the IRS’s use of social media data mining 
presumably would spare those who are quiet—those who are 
sophisticated enough to maintain online privacy, who know what not 
to post, those who are so down-and-out that they lack access to the 
internet, or those who lack the instinct to post about their lives on social 
media. A sophisticated individual will follow the advice of privacy law 
scholar Joshua Fairfield, who advises that one way for a device user to 
protect one’s privacy is to “provide false information where possible, 
to make the algorithms less sure.”183 
I can imagine instances in which an algorithm might also target those 
who maintain a social media presence but are silent as to certain aspects 
of their lives. Imagine a taxpayer who has qualifying children she 
claims for the EITC and child tax credit. What if she maintains an active 
Facebook page but never posts pictures of her children? This is not a 
farfetched scenario: many people choose not to post photos of their 
children due to privacy concerns or simply because their children ask 
them not to do so. Based on the absence of photos, would an algorithm 
suggest that the IRS select this taxpayer’s return for examination and 
require substantiation for the qualifying child claims, even if the 
existing databases (e.g., the Dependent Database) had not prompted it? 
180 Houser & Sanders, supra note 14, at 871. 
181 Harwell, supra note 71. 
182 Marks, supra note 25, at 109. 
183 Joshua Fairfield, 7 Things I Teach My Kids About Privacy, MEDIUM (Sept. 9, 2020), 
https://medium.com/@fairfieldj/7-things-i-teach-my-kids-about-privacy-24372552cde0 
[https://perma.cc/5DTP-42T4] (explaining that, as device users, we lack the ability to protect 
our data but can take certain steps to protect our privacy). 
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Another concern is the proliferation of fake social media accounts, 
including for nefarious purposes.184 There have been publicized cases 
of criminals impersonating individuals on Facebook in order to scam 
unsuspecting individuals.185 Would this affect the social media mining 
algorithm, leading to time-consuming false positives? 
These are but a few suggestions of how social media algorithms 
might create red herrings for the IRS in many directions, directing 
scarce resources to dead ends rather than prioritizing human analytical 
work toward larger dollar cases. Are there other, more effective ways 
to use social media as a tax compliance tool? Returning to the extreme 
examples of internet braggadocio, the IRS Whistleblower Program 
provides an example that might be instructive to draw upon in this 
regard. 
B. Whistleblowers: Should the IRS Encourage Social Media
Snitching, and Under What Circumstances? 
Recall the story of the woman in Pennsylvania who brazenly posted 
an offer on Facebook to trade her SNAP card for cash.186 Social media 
was her downfall, but she wasn’t caught by an algorithm or even by an 
agency employee conducting a manual search.187 Something old-
fashioned happened: someone snitched on her.188 A member of the 
public saw the post, recognized the illegal nature of it, and contacted 
the agency to report it.189 This example underscores something about 
human nature: if people are morally outraged by something, they will 
speak up. Thus, it is possible that social media will serve as a tool for 
184 See Arun Vishwanath, Habitual Facebook Use and Its Impact on Getting Deceived 
on Social Media, 20 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 83 (2015) (describing how habitual 
Facebook use may increase the user’s vulnerability to phishing attacks on social media 
sites). 
185 See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Facebook Connected Her to a Tattooed Soldier in Iraq. Or 
So She Thought, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28 
/technology/facebook-military-scam.html [https://perma.cc/UR8E-PVWR] (“[There are] 
two sides of a fraud that has flourished on Facebook and Instagram, where scammers 
impersonate real American service members to cheat vulnerable and lonely women out of 
their money.”). 
186 Following the tip from a member of the public, investigators arrested Tanya Keenan 
Mac after she traded her EBT card for heroin. Kristina Papa, Food Stamp Facebook Post 
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enforcement whether the IRS chooses to mine it or not. Not every 
instance of internet braggadocio is as outrageous as the examples of 
John McAfee and Rashia Wilson or even as overt as that of the woman 
in Pennsylvania. Most social media leads will be subtler and may be 
useful only in conjunction with other information known to the viewer. 
In his 1996 article suggesting ways to improve public perceptions of 
the tax system, Joshua Rosenberg proposed ways to encourage and 
even financially incentivize the public to report tax avoidance to the 
authorities, arguing that fostering communication (rather than 
polarization) with the IRS may improve attitudes toward tax 
compliance.190 Along those lines, perhaps it might be more appropriate 
to leave social media monitoring to the public and not have the IRS 
initiate it. In that framework, the IRS is not doing the frontline social 
media mining, which eliminates the unwelcome “Big Brother” feeling 
of the government monitoring your posts. 
The IRS already has some mechanisms in place for members of the 
public to report tax noncompliance. Anyone can report a “suspected tax 
law violation” on IRS Form 3949-A, which can be submitted 
anonymously.191 The form provides a place to report the name of the 
alleged wrongdoer, and the informant can tick one or more of twenty 
boxes to describe the alleged violations. These boxes range from very 
common types of civil noncompliance (failure to file a return, failure 
to pay tax, EITC, unreported income) to more serious criminal 
allegations (narcotics income, kickback, organized crime, corruption). 
In addition to this information referral form, which anyone can use 
to report a variety of suspected misconduct, the IRS has a statutory 
whistleblower program. Internal Revenue Code § 7623, as originally 
enacted, was an informant claim program authorizing the Secretary of 
Treasury to pay financial awards as necessary for “(1) detecting 
underpayments of tax,” or “(2) detecting and bringing to trial and 
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or 
190 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How 
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155 (1996). 
191 IRS, FORM 3949-A, INFORMATION REFERRAL (2016). IRS procedures for screening 
these forms are described in the Internal Revenue Manual, though parts are redacted. IRM 
3.28.2 (Aug. 1, 2020). 
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conniving at the same.”192 Section 7623(b), added in 2006,193 created 
a formalized whistleblower program, providing that a whistleblower 
shall “receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 
percent of the proceeds collected as a result of the action . . . or from 
any settlement in response to such action,” with the amount of the 
award determined based upon “the extent to which the individual 
substantially contributed to such action.”194 The 2006 amendment also 
mandated the creation of an IRS Whistleblower Office to implement 
the program.195 
Under the IRS Whistleblower Program, an award applies only in 
cases in which (1) an individual taxpayer’s gross income exceeds 
$200,000 in the year at issue; or (2) the proceeds in dispute exceed 
$2,000,000.196 Thus, Congress designed the program to incentivize tips 
or reports of significant evasion or of evasion by taxpayers with 
significant income.  
Notably, the award is decreased in cases “based principally on 
information disclosed in certain public sources . . . .”197 This limitation 
192 I.R.C. § 7623(a). Internal revenue informant laws have been in effect since 1867, but 
the significant revisions that created the whistleblower program were enacted in 2006. 
See IRS, History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program (June 18, 2020), https://www.irs 
.gov/compliance/history-of-the-whistleblower-informant-program [https://perma.cc/8HF3 
-HUY2].
193 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, tit. IV, § 406,
120 Stat. 2958.
194 I.R.C. § 7623(b). 
195 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(b). 
196 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5). The most prominent IRS whistleblower is Bradley Birkenfeld, 
the UBS banker who divulged information to the IRS about Swiss banking schemes that 
amounted to criminal tax evasion. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 
Million by I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/ 
business/whistle-blower-awarded-104-million-by-irs.html [https://perma.cc/Q37C-6GAB]. 
Birkenfeld, himself a subject of the criminal investigation and who served two and a half 
years in prison for his role in the scheme, made use of the IRS Whistleblower Program and 
received the largest ever award, $104 million. Id. The information he provided to the IRS 
yielded a lot of fruit: thousands of names of U.S. offshore bank account owners were 
provided to the IRS, and thousands of other offshore bank account holders voluntarily 
disclosed their accounts as part of an amnesty program that resulted. Id. The IRS estimated 
that Birkenfeld’s information “helped recover more than $5 billion in unpaid taxes.”As the 
article notes, whistleblower awards constitute gross income, so the IRS ultimately receives 
part of the award back in tax revenue. Id.  
197 IRS, PUBLICATION 5241, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2019.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/3HSB-N2AE]; see also I.R.C. § 7623(b)(2). The award is also decreased when 
the whistleblower “planned and initiated the actions” that led to the tax law violations. I.R.C. 
§ 7623(b)(3).
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is likely to become relevant if a whistleblower’s basis for the claim is 
information he or she saw on a taxpayer’s Facebook or Twitter page. 
While most tips from social media would be unlikely to meet the 
criteria of the formalized whistleblower program, the IRS has fixed a 
general framework for individuals to report noncompliant taxpayers. 
Instead of pursuing a third-party tool for social media mining, the IRS 
could simply leave the online snooping to the public, and the agency 
can follow its existing procedures in pursuing any social media-related 
tips that are reported on Form 3949-A or whistleblower claims. 
C. Proposals for Setting IRS Policies on Social Media Mining:
Balancing Modern Enforcement Techniques with a Taxpayer
Right to Privacy 
1. The IRS Should Clarify Its Understanding of the Taxpayer “Right
to Privacy”
As a starting point, the IRS ought to define more clearly its 
interpretation of a taxpayer’s right to privacy. Michael Hatfield’s 
scholarship provides examples illustrating the breadth of personal 
information that may be tax relevant.198 Hatfield warned that 
technological advances, including the use of big data mining, would 
undo the privacy protection previously afforded to individuals when 
the IRS faced a structural inability to review all the information 
available to it.199 
Notions of privacy are rapidly changing. Perhaps it is not even 
possible for the IRS to define its conceptualization of taxpayer privacy. 
That would be a legitimate position—if that is the case, it ought to say 
so explicitly. In part parroting the statutory language of § 7602(e), the 
IRS website explanation of the taxpayer right to privacy states the 
agency “should not seek intrusive and extraneous information about 
your lifestyle during an audit if there is no reasonable sign that you 
198 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 631 (referencing the potential tax relevance of sleeping 
arrangements, marital discord, therapy sessions, and health and social club memberships, 
among other things); see also Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319, 321 (2015) (describing instances of how the IRS is entitled to 
collect information about individuals’ hobbies, reading preferences, religious affiliation, 
travel plans, weight and doctor’s recommendations about it, abortion, sterilization, or gender 
identity disorder). 
199 Hatfield, supra note 14, at 631–32 (“[G]iven how much personal information will be 
covered by the coming technology and how much personal information is potentially tax 
relevant, it is hard to have anything but a dystopian vision of this future . . . .”). 
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have unreported income.”200 However, most of what is posted on social 
media is extraneous to one’s income situation. If the IRS is routinely 
surveilling social media at large (even if by algorithm as opposed to 
manually), rather than making targeted searches after finding signs of 
unreported income, then it is seemingly violating its own principle. 
2. Increase Transparency of Audit Techniques
Relatedly, if the IRS does not believe that taxpayers have a right to
privacy in their social media posts, and if it intends to use automated 
techniques to trawl all forms of social media for possible enforcement 
leads, it ought to state that intention clearly and explicitly. At least then 
the public will be on explicit notice that the IRS is watching their social 
media. Just as posted signs warn motorists of traffic cameras on roads 
or notify the public of security cameras at tourist sites and stores, 
taxpayers should be on notice that the IRS is monitoring their social 
media activity. Further, the IRS ought also to provide specifics as to its 
methods: whether the mining is manual or automated; whether the 
agency is searching indiscriminately or only with cause; whether it is 
doing so in civil cases or only for criminal investigations; and whether 
it is doing so in connection with examinations, collections, or both. 
This information ought to be prominently displayed on the IRS 
website. The IRS could undertake a public relations campaign to this 
effect, using social media as its own tool for spreading the word to 
taxpayers. If it wishes, it might even openly encourage people to report 
one another when they see incriminating information on other people’s 
social media. Imagine such a tweet from the IRS: “Do your patriotic 
duty: retweet suspected tax noncompliance! #TaxGap @IRStaxpros 
#taxcompliance.” If that is how the IRS wishes to operate, it should 
make that known to the public so that people can proceed accordingly. 
3. Limit Social Media Investigations to Manual Searches Rather than
Automated, and Define Limits in the Internal Revenue Manual
If the IRS pursues social media mining as part of its enforcement 
strategy, it will face decision points in setting the contours. A critical 
first question is to what extent the mining should be done by humans 
as opposed to by algorithms. If the mining is done by algorithms, a 
200 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 7: The Right to Privacy, IRS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www 
.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-7-the-right-to-privacy-0 [https://perma.cc/2CH5 
-KR7D].
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second question is whether mining should be limited only to current 
investigations or used more widely to cast the broadest possible net. 
Software programs for data mining produce false positives and are 
potentially discriminatory. Of course, the same risks are inherent in 
humans performing manual searches on social media. But humans can 
play a role in procedural protections, especially if trained in how to 
conduct searches in a way that minimizes false positives. In the context 
of whether the Social Security Administration should explore greater 
use of social media in its investigatory work, Social Security 
Commissioner Michael J. Astrue told members of Congress that, in his 
view, professionally trained fraud investigators should be the ones 
evaluating circumstantial evidence of fraud, not administrative law 
judges or other employees: “Social media sites are not exactly clear and 
reliable evidence . . . Facebook puts up phony websites under my name 
all the time.”201  
Additionally, humans face constraints that computers do not: for 
one, they have only a limited number of work hours in the week. 
Humans do not have time to engage in widespread social media mining 
on a random basis, nor would it be cost efficient for them to do so. 
Thus, it would be logical to limit employee use of manual searches to 
the context of existing enforcement cases. This would be most 
consistent with the limits imposed by § 7602(e), providing that the IRS 
should not engage in broad fishing expeditions based solely on signs of 
financial status but can conduct lifestyle audits once the agency finds 
“a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported 
income.”202 
Authorizing specially trained employees to undertake manual 
searches of social media in preexisting enforcement cases would be 
the least harmful alternative. There is a humanity to manuality that is 
not inherent in automated searches: it opens the door to mercy and 
201 Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook? Uncle Sam Wants to Watch What 
You Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/us/politics 
/social-security-disability-trump-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/BM7V-FA9D]. Pear quotes 
Astrue’s remarks in the 2019 article; the remarks were made in 2012 while Astrue was 
serving as Social Security Commissioner. In his testimony at the hearing, Astrue articulated 
the possibility that angry ex-spouses may post false information on Facebook. The Social 
Security Administration: Is It Meeting Its Responsibilities to Save Taxpayer Dollars 
and Serve the Public?: S. Hearing 112-751 Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 112th 
Cong. (2012) (statement of Hon. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security 
Administration). He also expressed a concern that “[i]f you allow broad social media access 
on government time, I think that becomes an enormous suck on productivity.” Id.  
202 I.R.C. § 7602(e). 
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discretion in the taxpayer’s favor. There is, however, still the risk of 
employee bias with manual searches. If the IRS were to adopt this 
technique, it ought to develop policies on when social media 
investigations are appropriate and what types of evidence might be 
probative. The IRS can incorporate these policies into the Internal 
Revenue Manual. Most importantly, these tools ought not to be used to 
unduly scrutinize poor people. 
For example, with respect to collection enforcement, it may be 
appropriate for an Offer Specialist to manually search social media 
while verifying the financial statements that were made by the 
applicant under penalties of perjury. Perhaps an Offer Specialist’s 
findings should weigh adversely only if a material misrepresentation is 
found and documented in writing in the file, and after the applicant has 
had a chance to respond to specific questions about the information 
viewed online. Imagine a manual social media search that appears to 
uncover an asset of significant value not reported on the Offer in 
Compromise financial statement: the Offer Specialist should be 
allowed to make further inquiries and document the findings and the 
applicant’s response as part of the administrative record. For example, 
if the Specialist sees a photograph of the taxpayer wearing a very 
expensive wristwatch that was not reported on the asset section of the 
financial statement, it is reasonable that the Specialist be permitted to 
ask the taxpayer about this. On the other hand, the Specialist should not 
be permitted to make value-laden inquiries as to the applicant’s 
expenses. For example, taxpayers submitting an Offer in Compromise 
are permitted to use a standard expense dollar amount to account for 
food, clothing, and certain other household items based on the size of 
the household; the IRS policy is to permit the standard figure without 
questioning the amount actually spent, and the taxpayer is not required 
to substantiate the allowable standard figure.203 Therefore, if the 
taxpayer has claimed the standard figure, the Offer Specialist should be 
barred from asking the taxpayer to increase the offer’s dollar amount 
on the basis that the taxpayer has been spotted on social media smoking 
cigarettes, eating steak, or wearing designer-brand clothes.  
203 See Collection Financial Standards, IRS (Nov. 19. 2020), https://www.irs.gov 
/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/collection-financial-standards [https://perma 
.cc/3TGE-JS9B]. 
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4. If Automated Social Media Mining Is Used, Implement Use of Pre-
Examination Soft Letters to Nudge Taxpayers Detected by the
Algorithm
If the IRS proceeds with using social media mining, it should do so 
as part of an announced compliance campaign. Rather than moving 
straight to opening examinations based on results, as a first step, the 
IRS should send selected taxpayers a “soft letter” as a nudge to improve 
compliance. The idea behind such an initiative is to let taxpayers know 
that the IRS is undertaking a new enforcement technique or enhancing 
enforcement of a particular type. The IRS refers to these as 
“educational letters,” and there is precedent for broad use of these 
letters in targeted areas of suspected noncompliance. In recent years, 
the IRS has sent soft letters to cryptocurrency holders,204 offshore 
account holders,205 and taxpayers known to have engaged in specific 
types of transactions that the IRS suspects might be abusive.206 
The Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a study in which it sent 
educational letters to taxpayers whose returns were not selected for 
examination, but nonetheless appeared to have erroneously claimed the 
EITC on their 2014 tax return.207 The study found that the letters were 
effective in improving compliance the following year in some 
particular contexts, with taxpayers not making the same mistake the 
next year.208 During her time as National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina 
204 See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-132 (July 26, 2019). Taxpayer Advocate Erin 
Collins recently criticized the scope of these letters, calling it “disturbing” that these letters 
imposed “unreasonable burdens on [taxpayers] outside the protection of an examination.” 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2021, at 80 
(2020). 
205 See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS to Target S Corporations, Foreign Disclosures in 
New Campaigns, FORBES (July 24, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kelly 
phillipserb/2019/07/24/irs-to-target-s-corporations-foreign-disclosures-in-new-campaigns 
/#78f1f4313a38 [https://perma.cc/CE98-9U2H]. 
206 See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, IRS Sends Second Wave of Soft Letter Warnings to Certain 




207 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., STUDY OF SUBSEQUENT FILING BEHAVIOR OF 
TAXPAYERS WHO CLAIMED EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS (EITC) APPARENTLY IN 
ERROR AND WERE SENT AN EDUCATIONAL LETTER FROM THE NATIONAL TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, 2 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 32, 33 (2016). 
208 Id. The study found the educational letters were particularly effective with respect to 
educating taxpayers on the relationship requirement of the EITC but less effective with 
respect to taxpayers who claimed a child that was also claimed by another taxpayer. 
Extrapolating from the study, some types of noncompliance may be more easily corrected 
by an educational letter than others. See also NTA Blog, EITC – How a Simple Educational 
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Olson emphasized that, in order to be salient and effective, IRS letters 
or notices should be specific in content and tailored to the most relevant 
issues to the taxpayers.209 To be most effective, an educational letter in 
the social media context should address the specific mistake that is 
suspected, rather than be framed as a general reminder to comply with 
taxes. 
While I do not wish to see the IRS engage in widescale automated 
social media mining, sending educational letters to taxpayers based 
upon suspicious findings is a more reasonable first step than 
immediately opening an examination. The letter should specifically 
reference social media. Sending such a letter serves the goal of 
transparency, as it puts the taxpayer on notice that the IRS is surveilling 
their online activity and, ideally, will nudge the taxpayer to correct his 
or her behavior.210  
5. Sharply Define the Social Media Mining Criteria, Using It to
Target Only the Most Egregious Noncompliance
I find social media mining in tax enforcement cringeworthy at any 
income level, and my first preference is to keep the IRS out of this 
realm. However, if the IRS proceeds with this initiative, my alternative 
preference is for the agency to set its sights either on the most egregious 
types of tax noncompliance (regardless of income level) or on the 
highest earners, who have been the subject of a declining audit rate in 
the last decade.211 
Letter Can Help Avert Noncompliance, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https: 
//www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/ntablog-eitc-how-a-simple-educational-letter-can 
-help-avert-noncompliance/ [https://perma.cc/BGA9-KAVM].
209 NTA Blog, The IRS Should Redesign Its Notices Using Psychological, Cognitive,
and Behavioral Science Insights to Protect Taxpayer Rights, Enhance Taxpayer




-UFFF] (referring to notices in general, not educational letters in particular).
210 As governments in many other countries have done, the IRS has borrowed upon
behavioral science, psychology, and cognitive science in connection with its tax compliance
research; the IRS can use insights gleaned from its studies to design a social media soft
letter and determine which taxpayers should receive it. See TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV.,
LITERATURE REVIEW: IMPROVING NOTICES USING PSYCHOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS, 2 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 194 (2018).
211 See, e.g., Keith Fogg, IRS Large Case Examination Rate Collapses, PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (July 13, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-large-case-examination-rate
-collapses/ [https://perma.cc/VTL2-ECTD] (citing statistics from IRS 2019 Databook).
2021] #Audited: Social Media and Tax Enforcement 349
For example, could the IRS use social media mining to screen for 
potential tax protestors? It could set its data mining algorithm to search 
for social media posts that repeat or promote frivolous tax arguments, 
such as those compiled by the IRS on its website.212 
With respect to pursuing wealthy tax cheats, the IRS might wish to 
look to the examples of state revenue agencies and foreign revenue 
agencies using high-tech methods in enforcement. The New York State 
Department of Taxation is well known for using invasive methods 
(including social media) to track individuals who have ties to New 
York but claim to reside in lower-tax states on their tax filings.213 
These residency audits are aimed, strategically, at the wealthy as a 
means of maximizing the state’s revenue base.214 Greece made 
headlines when it used police helicopters and satellite images from 
Google Earth to locate home swimming pools as part of a large-scale 
crackdown on tax evasion and unreported income.215 
From a cost-benefit perspective, it makes sense to aim these 
initiatives at the wealthy if the revenue recouped from the positive 
results will offset the costs of chasing false leads. To some, these 
initiatives may create “feel-good” stories with the hope that such stories 
will boost tax morale (and thus boost individual compliance) among 
the larger public.216 Personally, I do not like the idea of the IRS 
tracking any class of individuals’ movements electronically—
normatively, this is more privacy than I wish for the public to sacrifice 
in the name of revenue collection217—so I do not favor this approach 
212 The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments, IRS (May 1, 2020), https://www.irs.gov 
/privacy-disclosure/the-truth-about-frivolous-tax-arguments-introduction [https://perma.cc 
/958W-MGGX].  
213 See, e.g., Robert Frank, Tax Collectors Chase Rich New Yorkers Moving to Low-Tax 
States. Auditors Inspect Cell Records, Even Your Dog’s Vet Bills, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2019, 
7:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/08/tax-collectors-chase-rich-new-yorkers-moving 
-to-low-tax-states.html [https://perma.cc/2EHE-ECL4].
214 Id. (“New York can’t afford to lose many millionaires or billionaires. The top 1
percent of earners pays 46 percent of the state’s income taxes . . . .”).
215 Daniel Steinvorth, Finding Swimming Pools with Google Earth: Greek Government
Hauls in Billions in Back Taxes, SPIEGEL INT’L (Aug. 2, 2010, 2:48 PM), https://www
.spiegel.de/international/europe/finding-swimming-pools-with-google-earth-greek-govern
ment-hauls-in-billions-in-back-taxes-a-709703.html [https://perma.cc/NCA5-V553]
(describing how these tactics revealed that the suburbs of Athens had 16,974 swimming
pools, rather than the 324 that had been reported).
216 Studies suggest that taxpayer compliance is directly correlated to perceived
compliance of others. See, e.g., Alm et al., supra note 104, at 297.
217 Recall that the IRS states that taxpayers have the right to expect enforcement action
will be “no more intrusive than necessary.” In my opinion, using data mining and
technological surveillance to track the personal lives of taxpayers without a specific
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even if targeted to the wealthy. But to the extent the IRS wishes to adopt 
these methods, I prefer targeting tax protestors, or the wealthy, to the 
idea of training an algorithm to tease out whether a poor person earns 
a little bit of extra cash on the side or whether a person in a $25 per 
month installment agreement could afford to pay a slightly higher 
amount but for the fact that she is smoking a pack of cigarettes a day. 
Targeting specific groups other than the poor would also serve as a 
counterweight to the fact that the lowest-income taxpayers are already 
subject to such a high audit rate. If nothing else, the agency’s 
enforcement efforts would be spread among a larger group of taxpayers 
(instead of increasing the focus on the poorest). 
6. Use Social Media Mining Only at Taxpayer’s Request, as a Method
of Dispute Resolution
As mentioned in the introduction, the RFI also raises the prospect of 
using a social media tool to protect taxpayers. While I do not favor the 
IRS searching individual taxpayers’ social media in any capacity, I 
would be curious to see how the IRS might use it to protect taxpayers: 
trading off taxpayer privacy only for good, rather than for 
enforcement.218 Recall the example of the man in Detroit who was 
wrongfully arrested and could have invoked social media in his alibi—
are there similar analogies to be envisioned for taxpayers?219 
Imagine if taxpayers could turn social media in their favor, electing 
at their option to use it as a defense or to substantiate their claims in 
disputes. For example, IRS underreporter notices are sometimes the 
first clue to taxpayers that they are victims of identity theft; because the 
notice lists all tax information reported by third parties, the taxpayer 
will see if income is wrongly reported by an unknown person who is 
working under the taxpayer’s social security number. In those cases, 
the taxpayer must contact the IRS and establish that the income listed 
on the notice does not belong to the taxpayer. Perhaps in some cases a 
taxpayer could use social media posts to demonstrate to the IRS that 
they had only one place of employment or that they had no connection 
suspicion of tax noncompliance is far more intrusive than tracking wages and financial 
transactions, the latter of which are justifiable for a revenue agency. 
218 Relatedly, though not specific to social media, see W. Edward Afield, Moving Tax 
Disputes Online Without Leaving Taxpayer Rights Behind, 74 TAX LAW. 1 (2020) 
(imagining how the IRS can deploy technology to resolve tax disputes in ways that are pro-
taxpayer rights). 
219 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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to the geographic location where the income was reported under their 
number.  
Perhaps social media could be used (again, I would propose it be 
allowed only at the taxpayer’s election) to substantiate an EITC claim 
upon examination. The IRS could institute a policy that the agency may 
consider a taxpayer’s social media evidence within its discretion; to 
protect taxpayers, it could further adopt a policy that no negative 
inference can be drawn from the social media sources. 
Some individuals have turned to technology (and opted to sacrifice 
a bit of their own privacy) as a method of tax planning: as a response 
to state residency tax audits, tax-specific compliance tools have 
become commercially available. Monaeo sells a so-called personal and 
audit defense system, which consists of an app and web interface that 
enable users to track and log their days in and out of a state, ensuring 
that they do not trip into residency status.220 
In discussing compliance burdens and how cultural norms around 
technology and privacy have changed and will continue to evolve, 
Michael Hatfield imagines a future in which taxpayers could choose 
between two systems depending on their privacy preference.221 One 
option Hatfield sets forth would be to voluntarily sacrifice privacy (by 
consenting to data surveillance) and in exchange receive certain tax 
benefits; the other option would be to opt out of surveillance and as a 
result give up the tax benefit.222 At least such a regime would put the 
taxpayer in control. 
III 
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRESENTING LOW-INCOME 
TAXPAYERS IN THE #TMI ERA 
In light of the IRS social media request for information, as well as 
broader trends signaling the loss of individual privacy, how should tax 
practitioners advise their clients? As the director of a low-income 
taxpayer clinic, I am most concerned with this vulnerable population 
of clients who receive our legal services on a pro bono basis. 
220 Frank, supra note 213. The article states that Monaeo said use of its “Personal 
Edition” app is up fifty-one percent in 2018 over 2017. See also MONAEO, https://monaeo 
.com/personal [https://perma.cc/RL64-9USL]. 
221 Hatfield, supra note 198. 
222 Id. at 352. Hatfield emphasizes the need for research as to taxpayer preferences, and 
he recognizes that “the tax law of 2040 should be fundamentally different than that of 2015 
if revolutionary technologies are to be integrated into its administration.” Id. at 366. 
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Increasingly, I see social media usage addressed in a variety of ways 
as a continuing legal education (CLE) topic. One such seminar advised 
lawyers how to use the internet as an investigative tool; the promotional 
flyer included agenda items such as “[f]ind out ‘secret’ ways to ferret 
out information from social media profiles” and suggested social 
media site navigation as a method to obtain background information 
about adverse parties, lawyers, judges, and current and potential 
clients.223 The CLE flyer suggests other uses for lawyers to navigate 
social media sites, including to (1) “[F]ind information to attack a party 
or witness’s credibility”; (2) “uncover fraud”; and (3) “seek out the 
smoking gun.”224 
Other CLE programs include discussion of how the profession’s 
ethical rules apply to social media. For example, may an attorney 
representing the defendant in a products liability case check the 
plaintiff’s social media sites without the plaintiff’s lawyer’s 
consent?225 C. Simon Davidson of law firm McGuire Woods posed 
this hypothetical and concluded yes, so long as there is no 
“communication” with the party or witness.226 Davidson cautions, 
however, that some state professional regulations “would prohibit 
arguably deceptive conduct designed to gain access” to those social 
media sites; presumably this would include setting up a fictional 
account to “friend” the party on Facebook or “follow” the party on 
Twitter.227 
If lawyers are regularly using social media as a tool for opposition 
research, what advice are they giving their own clients about how to 
manage social media without pitfalls? The obvious advice would be for 
clients to simply go dark: no Facebook, no Twitter, no Instagram. 
However, that might not be viable advice in the twenty-first century, or 
clients may not take it seriously. But it does not hurt to remind clients 
that the government may be mining their social media. I have seen posts 
by some of my own Facebook friends about how they want to borrow 
223 Carole A. Levitt & Mark E. Rosch, Social Media as Investigative Research, GA. 
LAWS. CLE, https://georgialawyersclewebinars.ce21.com/item/social-media-investigative 
-research-evidence-309411#tabDescription [https://perma.cc/78NN-FW37] (coauthors of
THE CYBERSLEUTH’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (14th ed. 2017)).
224 Id. 
225 C. SIMON DAVIDSON, THE ETHICS OF EMAIL AND SOCIAL MEDIA: A TOP TEN LIST 
302 (2017), https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/davidson_hypotheticals_and_analysis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QB8A-WCF2] (providing several examples of cases in which a party’s or 
witness’s postings on social media sites were a useful source of evidence).  
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
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someone else’s child for their tax return, and I have seen a compilation 
of tweets along the same line.228 I presumed at least certain of these 
were jokes, though sometimes it is hard to be sure. Can a data algorithm 
perceive a joke?  
Criminal defense attorneys advise their clients that social media is 
fair game for police investigators.229 In the civil context, divorce 
lawyers routinely advise clients to be careful about what they post on 
social media, cautioning that content posted can be used for a variety 
of purposes.230 Personal injury lawyers have a different set of best 
practices regarding social media posts depending on whether their 
client is the plaintiff or defendant.231 A concern cited by one plaintiffs’ 
attorney firm is the tendency of social media posts to broadcast one’s 
good news and downplay or ignore bad news, with the unintended 
consequence that “defendants looking to escape liability may point to 
such photos and posts as evidence that you are not really injured.”232 
For this reason, the law firm advises plaintiffs to refrain from social 
media posts following an injury.233 Harkening back to the analogy of 
228 See Drumbl, supra note 69. 
229 Tom Petersen, If You Are a Defendant in a Criminal Case — Be Careful What You 
Post on Social Media, PETERSEN CRIM. DEF. L. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.criminal 
defensene.com/if-you-are-a-defendant-in-a-criminal-case-be-careful-what-you-post-on 
-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/XG77-S4CV].
230 See, e.g., Jaliz Maldonado, Family Law: Social Media Evidence in Divorce
Cases, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/family
-law-social-media-evidence-divorce-cases [https://perma.cc/Y2UJ-PFL8]; Larry Upshaw,
Contemplating Divorce? 10 Critical Social Media “Don’ts” You Need to Know,
CONNATSER FAM. L., https://connatserfamilylaw.com/contemplating-divorce-10-critical
-social-media-donts-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/3YWS-332S] (last visited Jan.
24, 2021).
231 See, e.g., Frances Crockett Carpenter et al., Social Media Admissions in Personal 
Injury Cases: Mitigating Risk for Plaintiffs, Securing Admissions from Defendants, 
STRAFFORD PUBL’NS (May 10, 2017), https://www.straffordpub.com/products/social-media 
-admissions-in-personal-injury-cases-mitigating-risk-for-plaintiffs-securing-admissions
-from-defendants-2017-05-10 [https://perma.cc/6WCP-YZ7K] (“This CLE webinar will
provide guidance to personal injury litigators for mitigating the risks that social media posts
pose for their clients, as well as tips for tracking down admissions by defendants on social
media.”).
232 Amalia Lucero, Social Media Being Used as Evidence in Personal Injury Cases, 
CURTIS & CO. ATT’YS, https://www.curtislawfirm.org/articles/social-media-being-used-as 
-evidence-in-personal-injury-cases/ [https://perma.cc/U9F3-DNAU].
233 Id. Similar advice is found on other personal injury firm websites. See, e.g.,
Adam S. Kutner, How Social Media Can Impact Your Personal Injury Case, https://
www.askadamskutner.com/personal-injury/social-media-can-impact-personal-injury-case/
[https://perma.cc/U4VK-DFGZ] (“[I]f you’re claiming that you have a broken arm, but you
post on social media that you’re going bowling, the defense is going to challenge your
injuries.”).
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other agencies that administer social benefits, an attorney representing 
Social Security disability claimants states that he cautions new clients, 
“There is a little bitty chance that Social Security may be snooping on 
your Facebook or your Twitter account . . . . You don’t want anything 
on there that shows you out playing Frisbee.”234 
What about in the tax context? Tax attorneys Carina Federico and 
Travis Thompson observe, “It is imperative that modern tax 
practitioners develop a full understanding of a client’s digital 
footprint,” advising that “[c]lient intake questions should include 
inquiries about social media usage and online sales through digital 
marketplaces, at a minimum.”235 Federico and Thompson further 
suggest “practitioners should advise clients to be mindful about what 
they post on social media. For instance, a taxpayer should not tell the 
IRS that they do not have any money, but then post pictures of himself 
on Instagram with expensive cars or on an extravagant vacation.”236 In 
the litigation context, tax attorney James Creech advises lawyers to 
conduct due diligence of a client’s social media if the case “relies 
heavily on the petitioner’s credibility on the witness stand” and warns 
of the ethical consequences that may arise if a lawyer finds 
contradictory evidence on social media.237 
Should low-income taxpayer clinics adopt similar routine 
counseling tactics? Should our clients be counseled differently 
depending on whether the case involves an examination or a collections 
issue? 
Beyond just the litigation context that Creech discusses, tax 
attorneys should consider the wide range of their due diligence 
obligations. Our clients sign financial forms such as a Collection 
Information Statement or an Offer in Compromise under penalties of 
perjury. The professional regulations governing practice before the IRS 
impose upon tax practitioners an affirmative duty to exercise due 
234 Pear, supra note 201. 
235 Federico & Thompson, supra note 99, at 46. 
236 Id. 
237 Creech, supra note 22. Referring to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), Creech argues 
that social media posts can be a useful indicator of mindset: “The low threshold for 
publication and our cultural habit of oversharing and introspection mean that [social media 
posts] are probably a fairly accurate indicator of the declarant’s mental state.” Id. While I 
agree with Creech’s advice as to due diligence, it is important to remember that social media 
posts are not always an accurate depiction of one’s life. See Houser & Sanders, supra note 
14, at 841 (citing Minas Michikyan et al., Can You Guess Who I Am? Real, Ideal, and False 
Self-Preservation on Facebook Among Emerging Adults, 3 EMERGING ADULTHOOD 55, 60 
(2015)). 
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diligence when preparing, assisting with, or approving tax returns and 
other documents relating to tax matters, as well as due diligence in 
determining the correctness of oral and written representations made 
by the practitioner.238 Before submitting such financial forms and 
statements to the IRS, it would be prudent to also perform online 
searches of our clients to look for inconsistencies, the way that we 
might look for inconsistencies in a bank statement that supports such a 
form. In the bankruptcy context, there are multiple examples of debtors 
who failed to disclose assets or income and later ran into trouble 
because of social media posts.239  
Elaborating on the point made by Federico and Thompson, I can 
envision a number of similarly problematic tax scenarios, particularly 
in the collection context. What if social media reveals a side cash 
business, even one that is relatively low dollar? For our clients, that 
could have an impact on the “ability to pay” calculation, and it could 
materially change an Offer in Compromise. Even if the side business is 
fledgling or operating at a net loss, the failure to disclose it reflects 
poorly on the taxpayer’s honesty elsewhere on the form. Imagine a 
client’s Facebook page posting photos of puppies for sale or advertising 
to mow lawns or babysit. For low-income taxpayers in collections 
cases, even one or two hundred dollars a month of unreported income 
can create issues with collections alternatives, making them ineligible 
for financial hardship status or forcing a higher minimum payment in 
an installment agreement. This is an important conversation to have 
with clients and one that can complicate calculation of monthly income 
due to the unpredictability of an income stream from such sources. It 
prompts a broader question as well: Should tax professionals surveil 
their clients’ social media sites looking for any hint of unreported 
income in connection with preparation of a routine individual income 
tax return? 
Another vulnerable category of taxpayers is those requesting 
innocent spouse relief. In these cases, a taxpayer who has filed a joint 
income tax return with his or her spouse in the past is asking for relief 
from the joint liability, either because the IRS examined the return and 
238 Treasury Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (2021). 
239 See, e.g., Carolyn S. Toto & Kimberly Buffington, 50 Cent Breaks the Golden Rule 
of Social Media Posting, PILLSBURY INTERNET & SOC. MEDIA L. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.internetandtechnologylaw.com/50-cent-breaks-the-golden-rule-of-social-media 
-posting/ [https://perma.cc/55XW-HUD4]; Debtors Beware: Social Media Knows Where
Your Assets Are Buried, PILLSBURY INTERNET & SOC. MEDIA L. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.internetandtechnologylaw.com/debtors-social-media-assets-bankruptcy/
[https://perma.cc/3ADK-4PTA].
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found an understatement of tax or because the return showed a balance 
due that was not paid.240 These cases are directed to a centralized unit 
of the IRS, where an individual makes a determination using a number 
of factors, including the following: whether the requesting spouse had 
knowledge, or reason to know, of the understatement of tax when the 
return was filed; whether the requesting spouse received a significant 
benefit from the understatement or underpayment; and whether under 
all the facts and circumstances it would be unfair to hold the requesting 
spouse liable for the tax owed.241 When a taxpayer requests innocent 
spouse relief, the IRS sends a letter and questionnaire to that taxpayer’s 
spouse or ex-spouse (the “nonrequesting spouse”) and uses that 
response to evaluate the requesting spouse’s claim.242 If the requesting 
spouse appeals the determination in Tax Court, the nonrequesting 
spouse has a right to intervene in the case.243 Thus, it would be prudent 
for a requesting spouse to be particularly careful about what he or she 
posts to social media—both the IRS and the nonrequesting spouse may 
be looking at those posts. Of course, if the requesting spouse is in the 
middle of divorce proceedings, his or her divorce lawyer may already 
have advised him or her to shut down social media sites. But a 
significant number of innocent spouse claimants are unrepresented by 
counsel,244 particularly low-income claimants, and therefore they are 
not privy to such advice. 
To reiterate, I am not advising tax attorneys to help their clients 
engage in tax fraud, evasion, or any kind of noncompliance. My 
concerns are with broader systemic fairness. For example, will the use 
of social media mining increase the likelihood that IRS employees will 
make moral judgments of the poor? As Eubanks referenced in her 
work, we have seen examples in other contexts in which the behavior 
240 I.R.C. § 6015. 
241 See I.R.C. § 6015; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-34 I.R.B. 397; I.R.S. Pub. 971 (Oct. 20, 
2014).  
242 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-6(a)(1); see also IRM 25.15.3.4 (Dec. 12, 2016) (“The 
[nonrequesting spouse] must receive notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, any 
proceeding with respect to an innocent spouse relief request.”). 
243 See King v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 118 (2000). 
244 See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse 
Relief: Do Courts Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent?, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 668 
(2012) (highlighting the high number of pro se petitioners appealing the outcome of their 
innocent spouse determination in court, but also remarking that “representation does not 
appear to be a critical matter for determining whether a spouse wins”). Because McMahon’s 
study draws upon data from cases litigated in federal courts, her statistics reflect only 
requesting spouses who appealed the denial of their request in court, as opposed to the 
broader universe of all requesting spouses who submit a request. Id. at 648. 
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of poor people is scrutinized, with officials publicly shaming the 
behavior as part of a broader policy conversation.245 I can envision a 
situation in which politicians question the IRS allowance of a standard 
household expense figure by citing examples of individuals who were 
granted financial hardship status appearing on social media smoking a 
cigarette, drinking a six-pack of beer, or sporting a tattoo. The 
underlying expense of any of those things could unfortunately yet 
easily become the subject of moral judgment, such as the judgment that 
the taxpayer could have allocated that money to rent or food.246 
Regardless of whether the IRS chooses to move forward with social 
media mining, or whether and how it publicly defines a taxpayer’s right 
to privacy, it seems wise to err on the side of assuming that all 
electronic transactions, actions outside one’s home, internet activity, 
and social media posts may be subject to various levels of scrutiny and 
observation.247 As lawyers, whether one is a tax lawyer, a criminal 
defense attorney, or a family law specialist, it is prudent to remind our 
clients of this twenty-first century technological reality. 
CONCLUSION 
As I stated at the beginning, this Article is not meant as a defense of 
those who cheat on their taxes. I certainly do not condone faking 
financial hardship, fudging eligibility for social benefits, or hiding 
income from the IRS. Tax compliance is a serious problem, and one 
that deserves serious solutions. The underfunding of the IRS is likewise 
a serious problem and compels the agency to be creative in its 
enforcement solutions. 
This conversation is yet another reminder that the IRS is tasked 
by Congress with too many responsibilities in addition to tax 
administration and revenue collection. The agency is the administrator 
of refundable tax credits that operate as social benefits. It plays a 
significant role in oversight of the tax aspects of retirement plans, 
245 See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 30 (discussing how Eubanks uses the example of the 
public shaming of TANF recipients who use ATMs in certain locations). 
246 See generally Zelenak, supra note 56 (discussing how the public views tax cheats 
versus welfare cheats). 
247 See, e.g., Heather Kelly & Rachel Lerman, America Is Awash in Cameras, a Double-
Edged Sword for Protesters and Police, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/03/cameras-surveillance-police-protesters/ 
[https://perma.cc/53ZG-9YKA] (describing law enforcement’s use of surveillance cameras, 
body cameras, and face- and object-recognition software, as well as private citizens’ use of 
smart phones, home security cameras, and vehicle cameras, and describing the metadata 
contained in these videos and photos).  
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nonprofit organizations, and healthcare-related provisions. It gets 
called upon to administer financial aid in times of crisis, as in the 
COVID-19 pandemic when the IRS was unexpectedly tasked with 
delivering economic impact payments to millions of individuals, 
including those with no taxable income or filing requirement. It stands 
to reason that the agency—overtasked and underfunded—is searching 
for shortcuts in the name of efficiency. 
Despite these pressure points, to which I am sympathetic, I sincerely 
hope that the agency will choose not go down the road of cheap and 
easy in relying on big data and social media analytics for collection and 
examination purposes. The IRS aspires in its mission statement to 
“enforc[e] the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”248 In my view, 
incorporating social media mining as a routine part of examination and 
collection would undermine the dignity of the taxpayers, as well as the 
integrity of the agency. 
248 I.R.S. Policy Statement 1-236 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
